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From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters: 
Australia’s Distinctive Path to Relationship 
Recognition 
Reg Graycar* 
Jenni Millbank** 
INTRODUCTION 
Marriage has been the central focus of the struggle for same-sex 
relationship rights in the United States for many years now. 
Arguably, marriage has come to occupy a central place in the 
collective imagination; indeed, “gay marriage” is often used as a 
short-hand in popular discourse to stand for any and every form of 
same-sex relationship recognition. Yet even in some jurisdictions that 
have now opened marriage to same-sex couples, marriage was not 
first, and is not the primary, form of relationship recognition.1 Same-
sex relationship rights are in a state of enormous flux with 
considerable variation apparent among the models, strategies, and 
substantive effects of recognition around the world. 
This Article reflects on the approaches that Australia, and to a 
lesser extent New Zealand, have taken to relationship recognition, 
focusing in particular on the ways in which they have differed 
profoundly from what has happened in the United States. 
Specifically, the relationship recognition debate in Australia through 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of Sydney. 
 ** Professor of Law, University of Technology, Sydney. We would like to thank Anthea 
Vogl, Tiffany Hambley, Matthew Weait and Sally Sheldon for their various contributions, and 
the Legal Scholarship Support Fund at the Faculty of Law, University of Sydney, for research 
support. 
 1. For instance, Canada and the Netherlands. For an excellent overview of the situation 
in Europe, see MORE OR LESS TOGETHER: LEVELS OF LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE, 
COHABITATION AND REGISTERED PARTNERSHIPS FOR DIFFERENT-SEX AND SAME-SEX 
PARTNERS (Kees Waaldijk ed., 2005). 
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the 1990s was characterized by the absence of any real interest in 
marriage and instead focused on developing more functional and 
adaptive models of relationship recognition, primarily through 
presumption-based models (for example, the ascription of 
relationship status).2  
In the space of just seven years, Australia went from having 
virtually no recognition of same-sex partnerships to broad-ranging 
recognition across all of the Australian states and territories. In all 
jurisdictions, same-sex and heterosexual couples are now on an equal 
footing under legislation in areas such as inheritance of a partner’s 
property, workers’ and accident compensation, consent to a partner’s 
medical treatment, and property division upon relationship 
breakdown.3 In 1999 the largest state, New South Wales, first 
introduced legislation providing comprehensive presumption-based 
recognition for same-sex relationships.4 This built on a long standing 
model of “de facto” relationship status (known in Europe as 
“informal cohabitation”), available to heterosexual unmarried couples 
since the early 1980s. From 2001 to 2006 all other Australian states 
and territories also introduced comprehensive de facto relationship 
status for same-sex couples.5 These trends are in stark contrast to the 
federal arena where there is no explicit recognition of same-sex 
couples.6  
The aim of this discussion is to locate these developments in their 
political and legal context. This context helps to explain the wide 
divergence in approaches between relationship recognition law 
 
 2. Note that while we use the term “ascription,” as does the Law Commission of Canada, 
Marsha Garrison has referred to the imposition of such a status, in the context of the American 
Law Institute (ALI) principles, as “conscriptive.” Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An 
Evaluation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 818 (2005). 
 3. See Jenni Millbank, Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Families in Australian Law—
Part One: Couples, 34 FED. L. REV. 1, 27 (2006).  
 4. See Reg Graycar & Jenni Millbank, The Bride Wore Pink . . . to the Property 
(Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999: Relationships Law Reform in New South 
Wales, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 227 (2000). 
 5. See Millbank, supra note 3, at 9–32; infra note 60 for more recent developments in 
South Australia.  
 6. The few rights available to same-sex couples at federal level are through the limited 
non-couple “interdependent” category in a small number of areas. See JENNI MILLBANK, AREAS 
OF FEDERAL LAW THAT EXCLUDE SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THEIR CHILDREN (2006), available 
at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/samesex/docs/Same_Sex_Research_Paper200609.pdf. 
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reform debates in Australia (mainly focusing on presumption-based 
approaches), and the opt-in forms of recognition, ranging from 
marriage, civil unions, or registered partnerships, that seem to have 
been far more popular in other jurisdictions. More recently, however, 
following the opening of marriage to same-sex couples in some 
European jurisdictions and in Canada and Massachusetts, along with 
the introduction of a formal bar on same-sex marriage in Australia in 
2004,7 we have seen an increased focus on marriage as an institution 
that symbolizes inequality.  
Our near neighbor, New Zealand is a fascinating comparator, as it 
introduced presumptive recognition for same-sex couples (to a 
limited extent) in 2001 and followed this a few years later with 
extensive presumptive recognition in conjunction with opt-in civil 
unions, both of which are available to same-sex and heterosexual 
couples.8 The ongoing influence of the presumptive or “functional 
family” model9 is also apparent in Australia and New Zealand 
through the more recent development of automatic presumptions that 
grant parental status to lesbian mothers having children through 
assisted reproductive means.10 This stands in contrast to the more 
common use of opt-in models, such as second parent adoption, used 
to gain parental rights for the non-biological parent in lesbian 
families elsewhere in the world.11  
 
 7. Marriage Amendment Act, 2004 (Austl.). 
 8. See Civil Union Act 2004, 2004 S.N.Z. No. 102; Relationships (Statutory References) 
Act, 2005 (N.Z.). 
 9. For an early United States illustration of this approach, see Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. 
Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). This approach was adopted with much greater alacrity in a 
series of Canadian Charter challenges, many of them relying on the work of sociologist Margrit 
Eichler. See, e.g., Canada v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 (especially the dissent of Judge 
L’Heureux-Dubé); Re K, [1995] 15 R.F.L. (4th) 129 (Can.); M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); 
MARGRIT EICHLER, FAMILIES IN CANADA TODAY (2d ed. 1988); MARGRIT EICHLER, FAMILY 
SHIFTS: FAMILIES, POLICIES, AND GENDER EQUALITY (1997); see also Ghaidan v. Godin-
Mendoza, [2004] 2 A.C. 557 (H.L.) (U.K.) (where the House of Lords extended its Fitzpatrick 
decision by holding that a gay surviving partner was also a “spouse” for the purpose of the 
Rents Act; the House of Lords attributed this change in such a short period of time to the 
adoption by England of the Human Rights Act 1998); Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Hous. Ass’n, 
[2001] 1 A.C. 27 (H.L.) (U.K.) (where the House of Lords held that a deceased gay man’s 
surviving partner was a “member his family” for the purposes of succeeding to his tenancy).  
 10. See Jenni Millbank, Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Families in Australian Law—
Part Two: Children, 34 FED. L. REV. 205 (2006). 
 11. For discussions of second parent adoption in the United States, see Nancy Polikoff, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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We suggest that two key factors are responsible for the distinctive 
approach to law reform that has been taken in much of Australia. The 
first of these is the pre-existing legal terrain upon which same-sex 
relationship recognition was built. Australian law has treated people 
in cohabiting (though unregistered) heterosexual relationships in 
ways almost identical to married couples for a considerable period. 
This legal framework, of according presumptive status by way of 
recognizing de facto relationships, was then built upon in the 
relationship recognition debates, at least within the lesbian and gay 
communities in New South Wales (and more broadly, in Australia). 
This context provides a new twist to conservative arguments for the 
“special-ness” of civil marriage in Australia, since marriage makes 
little or no difference to the legal status of heterosexual couples. The 
other significant factor is the absence in Australia of a Bill of Rights, 
a Charter of Rights, or other form of constitutional guarantee of 
equality.12 Although New Zealand has a Bill of Rights with an 
equality guarantee, it is statutory only and does not have 
constitutional status (for which reason it does not provide an effective 
avenue for legislative challenges).13 This means that legal reforms in 
both countries have emanated from the legislature, rather than 
originating in or being influenced by judicial decisions. While this 
may have meant slow and piecemeal developments in many cases, it 
has also meant greater opportunity for gay and lesbian community 
groups to initiate and consult about reform options and to develop 
more diverse reform models. This is in marked contrast to the United 
 
The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is It an Option for Lesbian and 
Heterosexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 375 (1996); Ruthann Robson, Making 
Mothers: Lesbian Legal Theory & the Judicial Construction of Lesbian Mothers, 22 WOMEN’S 
RTS. L. REP. 15 (2000); Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-Parent 
Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 17 (1999).  
 12. See TOWARDS AN AUSTRALIAN BILL OF RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 1994); see also 
HILARY CHARLESWORTH, WRITING IN RIGHTS: AUSTRALIA AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS (2001); GEORGE WILLIAMS, THE CASE FOR AN AUSTRALIAN BILL OF RIGHTS (2004). 
Recently, the Australian Capital Territory and the state of Victoria have both enacted limited 
statutory bills of rights: Human Rights Act, 2004 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Charter of Human Rights 
and Responsibilities Act, 2006 (Vict.). Neither of these will have much if any impact on these 
issues since both statutes are very limited (for example, they cannot be used to strike down or 
vary inconsistent legislation) and have no power to affect federal law.  
 13. See Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109, §§ 4, 6.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/7
p 121 Graycar Millbank book pages.doc  9/26/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters 125 
 
 
States, Canada, and South Africa where litigation has been critical to 
legal developments.14 
In this discussion we start, by way of background, with an 
explanation of the development of widespread legal recognition of 
heterosexual non-marital cohabiting relationships (“de facto 
relationships”) in Australia. We then briefly outline the first same-sex 
relationship law reforms in Australia in 1999 in the state of New 
South Wales before touching on areas of similarity and difference in 
other Australian states and territories. We then critically analyze this 
history, highlighting the features that are distinctive to Australia, such 
as the emphasis on presumptive recognition, the move to recognize 
non-couple relationships, and, until recently, the lack of focus on 
marriage. Since 2004, marriage has come to be an increasingly 
popular equality goal in Australia and we consider possible reasons 
for this. We also examine the ways in which the open-ended 
“interdependency” relationship model, originally promoted by 
progressive functional family advocates has, arguably, been co-opted 
and subverted by conservatives. We conclude with some reflections 
on how these very different approaches might be explained.  
I. SOME LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN NEW SOUTH WALES: THE 1983 
LAW REFORM COMMISSION REPORT AND THE DE FACTO 
RELATIONSHIPS ACT 1984 
The starting point for comprehensive recognition of heterosexual 
cohabiting relationships in Australian law was the reference to the 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission of an inquiry into de 
facto relationships in 1981.15 Before then, a small number of state 
 
 14. See, e.g., Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004); 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Reference re Same Sex 
Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (Can.); Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and 
Another 2005 (60) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). Surprisingly, given remarks in the decision in Fourie 
about the harm of symbolic exclusion, the South African government reacted with a separate 
Civil Union Act rather than any amendment to the Marriage Act. While the Civil Union Act 
allows for a “civil union” to be solemnized either as a “marriage” or as a “civil partnership” this 
status is still separate from that under the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 (S. Afr.), although the rights 
accorded to each are expressly equated. See Civil Union Act 17 of 2006, §§ 2, 8, 13 (S. Afr.). 
 15. See N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, DE FACTO RELATIONSHIPS (Report 36), at ch. 1 
(1983) [hereinafter DE FACTO RELATIONSHIPS]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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(and federal) laws had recognized de facto relationships for very 
limited purposes.16 While the terms of reference of the inquiry 
referred to “the law relating to family and domestic relationships,” 
and specifically to de facto relationships, the Law Reform 
Commission decided at a preliminary stage to focus exclusively upon 
heterosexual de facto relationships and not to extend its 
recommendations to “other domestic or household relationships, such 
as those constituted by parents and adult children, siblings, 
homosexual couples, or larger groups living in a common 
household.”17  
The main recommendation of the 1983 report was the introduction 
of a new legislative property division regime for heterosexual de facto 
couples (excluded from federal family law for constitutional reasons)18 
 
 16. Some examples are discussed by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission. Id. 
at ch. 4. This report was the outcome of the first Australian broad-ranging, public and 
government initiated law reform project. Interestingly, the Law Commission of England and 
Wales commenced an inquiry into similar issues in 2006, after the government enacted 
legislation enabling same-sex couples to register civil unions. LAW COMM’N OF ENG. & 
WALES, COHABITATION: THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF RELATIONSHIP BREAKDOWN 
(2006), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp179.pdf; see Anne Bottomley, From 
Mrs. Burns to Mrs. Oxley: Do Co-Habiting Women (Still) Need Marriage Law?, 14 FEMINIST 
LEGAL STUD. 181 (2006); Simone Wong, Cohabitation and the Law Commission’s Project, 14 
FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 145 (2006).  
 17. See DE FACTO RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 15, § 1.3. The Commission noted:  
The distinction drawn by the law accepts that de facto relationships resemble marriage 
to a certain extent, although not in all respects. It is this partial resemblance which has 
prompted legislators and policy makers specifically to confer rights and impose 
obligations on de facto partners in certain situations. Other domestic relationships bear 
less resemblance to marriage. 
Id. § 1.4.  
 18. See Commonwealth of Australia Constitution at section 51(xxi), which provides the 
federal government with power to legislate with respect to marriage, while section 51(xxii) 
refers to “divorce and matrimonial causes; and in relation thereto, parental rights, and the 
custody and guardianship of infants.” See also Marriage Act, 1961 (Austl.). There have been 
two significant shifts in the federal/state balance with regard to “family law.” First, while 
children’s issues involving ex-nuptial children used to be “state” matters, now (with the 
exception of child welfare and adoption) all other children’s issues (particularly residence and 
contact) fall within the jurisdiction of the federal Family Law Act, 1975 (Austl.), irrespective of 
the marital status of the child’s parents. This is because between 1986–1990 all states (other 
than Western Australia) transferred some of their powers over children to the Commonwealth. 
The terms and limitations of these transfers of power are recognized in the Family Law Act, 
1975, § 69ZE (Austl). Western Australia did not do so, as it has a complementary family law 
system. See Family Court Act, 1997 (W. Austl.). More recently, the states and territories 
(except Western Australia) agreed to refer their powers over the property disputes of all 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/7
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as well as the inclusion of heterosexual de facto relationships in a 
small number of other New South Wales Acts.19 The report was 
implemented in 1984 with the enactment of the De Facto 
Relationships Act.20 
A de facto couple was defined as two people living together as 
husband and wife on a “bona fide domestic basis.”21 In subsequent 
years, cohabiting heterosexual couples gradually came to be included as 
“spouses” for many different purposes in a wide range of laws, and the 
difference between marriage and “de facto marriage” narrowed 
significantly.22  
Since the enactment of this legislation in 1984, the ascription of “de 
facto” status has been presumption-based, that is, it applies to all those 
who meet the statutory criteria, rather than only those who opt in or 
register their relationship.23 The premise of the legislation is that such 
 
unmarried couples to the Commonwealth. Thus far, four states and territories have done so. See 
Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act, 2003 (N.S.W.); Commonwealth Powers 
(De Facto Relationships) Act, 2003 (Queensl.); Commonwealth Powers (De Facto 
Relationships) Act, 2004 (Vict.); De Facto Relationships (Northern Territory Request) Act, 
2003 (N. Terr.). However, the Commonwealth has indicated that it will only legislate for 
heterosexual couples and not accept the reference for same-sex couples. See MILLBANK, supra 
note 6, at 48–49. 
 19. See Graycar & Millbank, supra note 4, at 232.  
 20. See the De Facto Relationships Act, 1984 (N.S.W.). The Property (Relationships) 
Legislation Amendment Act, 1999 (N.S.W.), inserted a new definition of de facto relationship 
into what had been the De Facto Relationships Act, 1984 (N.S.W.), and renamed it as the 
Property (Relationships) Act, 1984 (N.S.W.). For details of the changes made in 1999, see 
Graycar & Millbank, supra note 4. 
 21. New South Wales’ 1984 De Facto Relationships Act defined a de facto relationship 
as: 
(a) in relation to a man, a woman who is living or has lived with a man as his wife on a 
bona fide domestic basis although not married to him, and (b) in relation to a woman, a 
man who is living or has lived with the woman as her husband on a bona fide domestic 
basis although not married to her. 
De Facto Relationships Act, 1984, § 4 (N.S.W.). 
 22. Ironically, the only lasting difference in New South Wales relates to the regime for 
dividing property upon the break down of the relationship. This was the first aspect of the 
reforms and is the one major difference in treatment between married and unmarried couples 
whose relationships ends. See id. § 20; see also Graycar & Millbank, supra note 4, at 233–34. 
States and territories that reformed their laws later tended to do so by reference to the Family 
Law Act, 1975 (Austl.) (the law that governs divorce and property adjustment for those ending 
marriages), which provides a much broader power to adjust property interests when a marriage 
breaks down. At least for heterosexual couples, once the reference of powers comes into effect, 
that difference will disappear. See supra note 18. 
 23. When enacted, the De Facto Relationships Act, 1984, §§ 44–47, provided for the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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couples are married in fact if not in law; hence, de facto spouses and de 
facto relationships quickly became accepted legal and social concepts in 
Australia.24  
II. THE BRIDE WORE PINK: COMMUNITY-INITIATED LAW REFORM  
Although the Law Reform Commission in its 1983 report on de 
facto relationships suggested that a broader inquiry into relationship 
law reform might be appropriate, no such inquiry was forthcoming.25 
Nor was there any formal review of the operation of the 1984 De 
Facto Relationships legislation in its first fifteen years of operation.26  
However, community groups concerned about the lack of 
recognition for same-sex relationships developed their own 
discussion papers, carried out consultations, and, eventually, drafted 
legislation. In 1993 the Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby of New South 
Wales (GLRL)27 published a draft discussion paper titled The Bride 
Wore Pink, which set out a number of tentative proposals that then 
formed the basis of consultation in the gay and lesbian 
communities.28 In summary, it proposed that a number of New South 
Wales laws should be amended to enable people to nominate a person 
as someone with whom they have a “significant personal 
relationship” for particular purposes.29 The paper raised questions 
about the connection between couple relationships and legal rights 
and obligations, and specifically proposed that different people might 
 
making of binding cohabitation and separation agreements; in effect, the scheme allowed 
people to opt out of the property division regime, whereas some of the registration schemes 
discussed below only apply to those who opt in.  
 24. The term has come to be widely used and accepted in Australia, but strictly speaking, 
the “de facto relationship” is something of a misnomer; the more appropriate term might be “de 
facto marriage.”  
 25. DE FACTO RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 15, §§ 1.3–1.4. 
 26. In 1999 the New South Wales government referred the Act to the New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission, shortly after passing the Property (Relationships) Legislation 
Amendment Act, 1999 (N.S.W.). N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, RELATIONSHIPS AND THE 
LAW: REVIEW OF THE PROPERTY (RELATIONSHIPS) ACT 1984 (2000), available at 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/digest.101 [hereinafter RELATIONSHIPS]. 
 27. See The Gay & Lesbian Rights Lobby, http://www.glrl.org.au (last visited May 17, 
2007). 
 28. The Bride Wore Pink: Legal Recognition of Our Relationships, 3 AUSTRALASIAN GAY 
& LESBIAN L.J. 67 (1993).  
 29. Id. at 83–86. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/7
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be nominated as the person with whom one had a significant personal 
relationship for different purposes.30 Even though the GLRL 
proposed an opt-in system, the ability to nominate different people 
for different purposes would have distinguished it significantly from 
registered partnership approaches in Europe and the United States. 
This model was presented to the lesbian and gay communities via a 
series of consultations and, as a result, the GLRL produced a revised 
version of The Bride Wore Pink in 1994.31 This final report 
abandoned the idea of allowing people to nominate more than one 
significant personal relationship as being too difficult to implement 
but recommended instead that legal recognition should 
simultaneously but distinctly be accorded to same-sex couple 
relationships and to people in other forms of interdependent 
relationships.32  
The dual model, recognizing couples and others, flowed from a 
concern referred to in both versions of the discussion paper that 
seeking recognition of gay and lesbian live-in couple relationships 
should not exclude many other people not living in couples, or 
couples who were not living together (whether or not gay or 
lesbian).33 In many ways the paper was influenced by the experience 
of the AIDS crisis in Sydney through the late 1980s and early 
1990s.34 This brought a heightened awareness of legal issues 
associated with illness and death, but also a greater concern for non-
couple relationships that involved caregiving or other forms of 
emotional or financial interdependence. For many lesbians and gay 
men (then and now), coming out led to a breach with families of 
origin and the formation of relationships with other lesbians and gay 
men. 
From the very first version of The Bride Wore Pink, the authors 
sought to go back to first principles, raising questions about marriage 
and, in particular, why certain rights and obligations were 
 
 30. Id. at 86–87. 
 31. GAY & LESBIAN RIGHTS LOBBY, THE BRIDE WORE PINK: LEGAL REGOGNITION OF 
OUR RELATIONSHIPS (2d ed. 1994), available at http://www.glrl.org.au/publications/major_ 
reports/bride_wore_pink.pdf. 
 32. Id. at 2–3. 
 33. See id. at 25–26; The Bride Wore Pink, supra note 28, at 83–84, 86–87. 
 34. GAY & LESBIAN RIGHTS LOBBY, supra note 31, at 14. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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automatically assumed to flow from marriage (and in some cases, 
other conjugal or “marriage-like” relationships).35 In other words, 
how had marriage become the original entitlement or benchmark?36 
In both editions, the GLRL called for “disaggregation,” for 
government policies to treat people as individuals for purposes such 
as social security (welfare) rather than as members of a couple.37 The 
discussion paper aired a number of significant policy concerns, 
critically evaluating the advantages as well as the disadvantages of 
relationship recognition. These included the issue of “who’s in/who’s 
out,” that is, assessing a concern that a group that has historically 
been marginalized ought not to replicate and reinforce other 
exclusions.38 It also expressed concern about the privatization of 
economic responsibility in an era of a shrinking welfare state, an 
acknowledgment that relationship recognition is often welcomed by 
governments (or courts) only insofar as it shifts financial burdens 
away from the public and toward private obligations.39 The GLRL 
 
 35. Paula Ettelbrick argued that, “The problem in this area is not so much that lesbian and 
gay couples cannot marry. Rather, it is that all of the legal and social benefits and privileges 
constructed for families are available only to those families joined by marriage and biology.” 
Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. 
& POL’Y 107, 122 (1996). The Law Commission of Canada raised similar questions about the 
assumption that marriage is the determinant of legal and social benefits in its research report, 
CANADIAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, LAW COMM’N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: 
RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001) [hereinafter 
BEYOND CONJUGALITY]; see also Susan B. Boyd & Claire F.L. Young, “From Same-Sex to No 
Sex”?: Trends Towards Recognition of (Same-Sex) Relationships in Canada, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. 
JUST. 757 (2003); Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending Marriage as We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
201 (2003). 
 36. Cf. Reg Graycar, Law Reform by Frozen Chook: Family Law Reform for the New 
Millennium?, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 737 (2000).  
 37. The main financial issue flowing from “disaggregation” is the payment of social 
security payments (which in Australia are more comparable to “welfare payments” since they 
are not contribution based). The Australian Social Security system treats people in heterosexual 
couples as married for a variety of purposes. By contrast, with some exceptions, Australia’s tax 
system is based on an individual unit of assessment, although in the past decade heterosexual 
household income has increasingly been used to determine eligibility for a number of health, 
child and family related payments. See MILLBANK, supra note 6 (in particular the sections on 
Medicare, the pharmaceutical benefits scheme, the child care rebate, and the family tax benefit).  
 38. The Bride Wore Pink, supra note 28, at 72–73.  
 39. See Jenni Millbank, An Implied Promise to Parent: Lesbian Families, Litigation and 
W v. G, 10 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 112 (1996); Claire Young & Susan B. Boyd, Losing the Feminist 
Voice? Debates on the Legal Recognition of Same Sex Partnerships in Canada, 10 FEMINIST 
LEGAL STUD. 213 (2006). 
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recognized the possibility that relationship recognition might most 
benefit the already-privileged, while at the same time it could 
exacerbate the disadvantages of impoverished people through the 
imposition of responsibility in areas such as welfare.40 Indeed, a 
version of this concern led to a shift toward a presumptive approach, 
away from an opt-in approach as had been proposed in the first draft. 
This preference for a presumption-based approach recognized that 
those most vulnerable are also those least likely to formally register 
their relationships and legal affairs, no matter what the system of 
recognition.41 There were also concerns that registration would 
reinforce a tiered approach to relationships, relegating same-sex 
relationships to a third tier (after marriage and heterosexual 
cohabitation).42 A further underlying theme of the discussion paper is 
a suspicion, clearly grounded in feminism, of marriage as the 
benchmark upon which other forms of relationships should be 
modeled,43 which led to a real attempt to use the consultation process 
to rethink some of the presumptions that have been so readily 
adopted in earlier debates. 
By the final report, the GLRL had a clear reform platform: seek 
immediate law reform on de facto relationships and domestic partners 
and ask a body such as the Law Reform Commission to consider in 
more detail fundamental questions concerning the focus of the law on 
“monogamy, exclusivity and blood relations,” and the need to 
recognize a broader concept of relationships.44  
 
 40. GAY & LESBIAN RIGHTS LOBBY, supra note 31, at 45–46. 
 41. Compare the ALI’s preference for a presumptive status to attach to cohabitants, which 
is explained as reflecting: “a judgment that it is usually just to apply to [cohabitants] . . . the 
property and support rules applicable to divorcing spouses, that individualized inquiries are 
usually impractical or unduly burdensome, and that it therefore makes more sense to require 
parties to contract out of these property and support rules than to contract into them.” 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03 
(2002). 
 42. GAY & LESBIAN RIGHTS LOBBY, supra note 31, at 8. 
 43. Id. at 34, 44. 
 44. Id. at 44–45. 
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III. WHY THE DUAL RECOGNITION MODEL?  
The overarching principle guiding The Bride Wore Pink was that 
the kinds of relationships that laws should regulate ought to depend 
upon the purpose of the law in question. As these purposes vary, so 
should the type of recognition or obligation. For example, some laws 
that recognize relationships do so because of financial dependence or 
interdependence between the partners (such as property division and 
inheritance laws) while others are more concerned with emotional 
connection (such as decision-making in the event of incapacity or 
death, including issues such as medical care or organ donation). Live-
in sexual relationships are not the only ones to give rise to such ties, 
but they are the relationships that are most likely to give rise to all of 
them. Therefore, the GLRL proposed that live-in partner relationship 
recognition should be broad-based and presumptive.45 While other 
forms of close relationships may give rise to emotional or financial 
ties in certain circumstances, those situations may not be so 
predictable or widespread. For that reason, they recommended a more 
limited strategy of recognizing other relationships for a smaller 
number of purposes. However, the GLRL considered it important to 
maintain the focus on couple relationships since, during the 
consultation process on The Bride Wore Pink, it became apparent that 
while members of the lesbian and gay communities were anxious to 
avoid excluding various kinds of relationships, they did not wish to 
see their own partner relationships identified by law as “other” 
partner relationships.  
IV. LEGISLATIVE REFORMS RECOGNIZING COHABITING COUPLES: 
1999–2005 
The GLRL’s proposals were adopted in a modified form in 1999, 
and since then New South Wales law recognizes same-sex couples in 
the same way as married and heterosexual unmarried couples for 
most legal purposes.46 Others who are not couples, but are in 
 
 45. Id. at 29–33. 
 46. The Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act, 1999 (N.S.W.), inserted a 
new definition of de facto relationship into what had been the De Facto Relationships Act, 1984 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/7
p 121 Graycar Millbank book pages.doc  9/26/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters 133 
 
 
(narrowly defined) “close personal relationships,” have some rights 
and obligations, though only under a very limited number of New 
South Wales laws.47 To this extent, it seems fair to assert that The 
Bride Wore Pink functioned as the key law reform document that 
guided the approach of the government.48 Though limited in scope, it 
was the first such reform in Australia,49 and later reforms built on and 
expanded it.  
The New South Wales reforms redefined a de facto relationship as 
“two adult persons” who “live together as a couple” and “are not 
married to one another or related by family.”50 The Act lists factors 
for determining whether a couple is in a de facto relationship.51 While 
a couple needs to be cohabiting to be recognized as a de facto couple 
under New South Wales law, only legislation relating to property 
division and inheritance sets a time period for that cohabitation.52  
Victoria became the next state to enact such legislation in 2001,53 
followed by Queensland in 2002,54 Western Australia in 2002 and 
 
(N.S.W.), now renamed the Property (Relationships) Act, 1984 (N.S.W.), and applied the new 
definition to numerous other pieces of legislation concerning matters such as guardianship, 
inheritance, accident compensation, stamp duty and decision-making in illness and after death. 
 47. The Property (Relationships) Act defines a “domestic relationship” as a de facto 
relationship or “a close personal relationship . . . between two adult persons whether or not 
related by family, who are living together, one or each of whom provides the other with 
domestic support and personal care.” Property (Relationships) Act, 1984, § 5(1)(b). 
 48. Then-Attorney-General Jeff Shaw acknowledged this and also referred to the work of 
the Anti-Discrimination Board and the AIDS Council of New South Wales. See Jeff Shaw, Law 
Reform Happens, 24 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 247 (1999). Since the introduction of the 1999 
legislation, a broader inquiry into relationships law reform has been languishing at the New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC). The NSWLRC published a discussion 
paper in 2002, and we await a final report. See http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lrc/ 
ll_lrc.nsf/pages/lrc_cref101 (last visited June 22, 2007).  
 49. Note, however, that in 1994, the Australian Capital Territory enacted the Domestic 
Relations Act, 1994, § 3(1) (Austl. Cap. Terr.), which defined a “domestic relationship” as 
including non-cohabitants, and indeed, non-conjugal couples. See Jenni Millbank, Domestic 
Rifts: Who Is Using the Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT)?, 14 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 163 
(2000). However, as will be discussed, later Australian Capital Territory reforms abandoned 
this broad approach.  
 50. Property (Relationships) Act, § 4(1). 
 51. Id. § 4(2). The criteria were drawn from D v. McA, (1986) 11 Fam. L. Rev. 214, 227 
(N.S.W.). 
 52. There is no time requirement for property division if the parties have a child, and there 
is also broad discretion to waive the time requirement if it would impose undue hardship on an 
applicant. Property (Relationships) Act, § 17(2). 
 53. Together, the Statute Law Amendment (Relationships) Act, 2001 (Vict.), and (a few 
months later) the Statute Law Further Amendment (Relationships) Act, 2001 (Vict.), changed 
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2003,55 the Northern Territory in 2003,56 Tasmania in 2003,57 and the 
Australian Capital Territory in 2003 and 2004.58 South Australia had 
bills before Parliament in 200459 and 2005, but it was not until 2006 
that the reforms were finally enacted in that state.60  
The various states and territories employ a range of different 
terminology. New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia, and 
the Northern Territory use the terms “de facto relationship” and “de 
 
over sixty pieces of law in Victoria to include cohabiting same-sex couples as “domestic 
partners” on the same basis as unmarried heterosexual couples. 
 54. In 2002 Queensland passed the Discrimination Law Amendment Act, 2002 
(Queensl.), which amended forty-five statutes to include same-sex couples as “de facto 
partners.” The Acts Interpretation Act, 1954, § 32DA(6) (Queensl.), now provides that any 
reference to a spouse in all Queensland-state legislation is taken to include a de facto partner 
unless the substantive act expressly provides to the contrary. 
 55. The Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Act, 2002 (W. Austl.), and 
Acts Amendment (Equality of Status) Act, 2003 (W. Austl.), amended over seventy statutes in 
Western Australia to include same-sex couples as de facto relationships. Western Australia is 
unique among Australian states in that it has its own family court. So, unlike reforms in other 
states, which left the federal family law regime untouched, Western Australia was able to 
absorb same-sex couples into its family law system both in relation to property disputes and as 
legal parents in relation to disputes over children. See Family Court Amendment Act, 2002 (W. 
Austl.).  
 56. The Law Reform (Gender, Sexuality and De Facto Relationships) Act, 2003 (N. 
Terr.), amended fifty-four pieces of territory legislation to include same-sex couples as de facto 
relationships. The amendments also included aboriginal customary marriages within the 
definition of “spouse” across a range of territory laws.  
 57. The Relationships Act, 2003 (Tas.), and Relationships (Consequential Amendments) 
Act, 2003 (Tas.), amended seventy-three statutes to include same-sex partners as “significant 
relationships.” The legislation also recognizes non-couples in more limited circumstances and 
allows for a form of registration for both couple and non-couple relationships. Id. 
 58. The Legislation (Gay, Lesbian and Transgender) Amendment Act, 2003 (Austl. Cap. 
Terr.), and the Sexuality Discrimination Legislation Amendment Act, 2004 (Austl. Cap. Terr.), 
together amended forty-one pieces of territory law to include same-sex couples as “domestic 
partnerships.”  
 59. In 2004 the Statutes Amendment (Relationships) Bill, 2004 (S. Austl.), proposed 
amendments to eighty-two state laws to include same-sex couples as “domestic partners.”  
 60. Statutes Amendment (Domestic Partners) Act, 2006 (S. Austl.). In South Australia the 
opposition blocked the government’s 2004 and 2005 bills to extend de facto relationship status 
to same-sex couples. The opposition introduced its own bill, proposing that all “other” or non-
heterosexual relationships could “opt-in” to a limited form of recognition. Relationships Bill, 
2005 (S. Austl.). In March 2006 the Labor Party won the state election and gained control of the 
upper house. In that year another piece of legislation was introduced, and on December 14, 
2006, the Statutes Amendment (Domestic Partners) Act, 2006 was enacted. This final version 
dropped the opt-in provisions and dual categories, and created one presumptive category of 
“domestic partner” that, although using the word “couple” in the definition, expressly includes 
non-sexual relationships in addition to couples. Statutes Amendment (Domestic Partners) Act, 
2006, § 74 (S. Austl.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/7
p 121 Graycar Millbank book pages.doc  9/26/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters 135 
 
 
facto partner.” Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory, and South 
Australia use “domestic relationship” and “domestic partner,” while 
Tasmania uses the term “significant relationship.”61 These differences 
in terminology are not of any real significance, as each jurisdiction 
has adopted a common set of criteria for determining the existence of 
such relationships in case of dispute. Generally speaking, there is 
now a far higher degree of consistency, both within and between 
states, in the rights granted to unmarried heterosexual and same-sex 
couples, and the definitions used to characterize them. 
V. IS COHABITATION REQUIRED? 
The most important substantive difference in the couple-based 
categories is in whether recognition as a couple requires cohabitation. 
Tasmanian law does not require that the couple live together, and 
Victoria has two definitions of a “domestic” relationship, one of 
which requires the couple to live together (this applies to laws that 
relate to financial rights or economic dependence) and another that 
does not require cohabitation (used in mostly health related areas and 
laws that concern emotional interdependence).62 Of the remaining 
jurisdictions that do require cohabitation, very few laws in each 
jurisdiction, principally those concerning inheritance and property 
division, include a requirement that the relationship be of a specific 
length to qualify (usually two years).63  
VI. THE ROLE OF PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENTS 
A significant trend evident in Australia is that Labor Party 
governments, many of them in their first term of office, introduced all 
major statutory reforms. This is consistent with worldwide trends, 
where it has been overwhelmingly center-left and leftist governments 
 
 61. See Millbank, supra note 3. 
 62. Id. 
 63. The South Australian reforms are the exception to this trend, setting a three-year 
cohabitation requirement for all state law (previously there was a five-year time requirement for 
heterosexual de facto couples under South Australian law). Statutes Amendment (Domestic 
Partners) Act, 2006, § 11A. 
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that have pursued same-sex relationship reforms.64 Perhaps 
unusually, Australian reforms have faced relatively little 
parliamentary opposition,65 with the Liberal (conservative) 
opposition often offering either no opposition or permitting its 
members to exercise a conscience vote.66 Only in Western Australia 
and South Australia has the opposition seriously attempted to prevent 
reform.67 At the time of writing, Western Australia is the only state 
with an opposition committed to the repeal of laws recognizing same-
sex relationships.68  
VII. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT 
There was considerable variation in the involvement of the gay 
and lesbian community groups in the reform processes, both in 
initiating the proposed reforms and in the context of public 
consultation. In New South Wales and Tasmania,69 gay and lesbian 
community groups first developed the models that formed the basis 
of legislation,70 while in the Northern Territory, a community legal 
 
 64. See Robert Wintemute, Conclusion, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX 
PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 759 (Robert 
Wintemute & Mads Andenæs eds., 2001).  
 65. For a discussion of the parliamentary debates in New South Wales, see Jenni Millbank 
& Wayne Morgan, Let Them Eat Cake, and Ice Cream: Wanting Something “More” from the 
Relationship Recognition Menu, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS, supra 
note 64, at 295  
 66. See Millbank, supra note 3, at 14, 17, 18. 
 67. Id. at 24, 32–35. 
 68. See Western Australia, Legislative Assembly Hansard 11 Dec. 2001, at 6914 
(statement of Colin Barnett), available at http://www.parliament.wa.gov.au/web/newwebparl. 
nsf/iframewebpages/Hansard+-+Advanced+Search (in “Date Is On:” field, type 11/12/2001). 
This was also a Western Australian Liberal Party policy in the 2005 state election, but the 
Liberal Party did not prevail. See also Stacy Farrar, Gay Rights Rollback; West Australian 
Liberals Call for the First Rollback of Gay and Lesbian Rights, SYDNEY STAR OBSERVER 
(Sydney, Austl.), Dec. 9, 2004, available at http://www.ssonet.com.au/archives/display.asp? 
articleID=4632 (last visited June 22, 2007). 
 69. In 1997 the Tasmanian Gay and Lesbian Rights Group proposed a model in which 
both couples and non-couples could be recognized through a presumptive status as well as 
registration, neither of which required cohabitation. See Rodney Croome, Relationship Law 
Reform in Tasmania, WORD IS OUT, June 2003, at 1, available at http://www.arts.usyd.edu.au/ 
publications/wordisout/archive/07croome.pdf (however, note that the remarks on adoption do 
not reflect the final Act, which was far more restrictive). 
 70. See LET’S GET EQUAL CAMPAIGN WORKING PARTY, POSITION STATEMENT: LEGAL 
RECOGNITION OF SAME SEX RELATIONSHIPS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA (2001), http://www. 
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center initiated the law reform.71 In other jurisdictions, such as the 
Australian Capital Territory, community groups formed in response 
to government initiated proposals, rather than themselves developing 
reform models.72 In Victoria73 and Western Australia,74 
representatives of gay and lesbian community groups participated in 
governmental advisory committees that formulated the platform for 
legislative action. 
As for the consultation processes, the Queensland and Northern 
Territory governments did not engage in any real form of public 
consultative process. By contrast, the Australian Capital Territory 
held open consultation processes for all stages of the reform 
process,75 while Tasmania and South Australia accepted limited 
public input through the parliamentary committee process.76 In New 
South Wales, as noted above, the reforms followed the work of the 
GLRL, but when the government introduced its own legislation, there 
was no further public consultation with affected communities. 
 
letsgetequal.org.au/LetsGetEqual_PositionStatem.pdf. For a discussion of the early years of the 
South Australian process, see Matthew Loader, Recognising Same Sex Relationships: Ideas and 
an Update from South Australia, WORD IS OUT, June 2003, at 8, available at http://www.arts. 
usyd.edu.au/publications/wordisout/archive/07loader.pdf.  
 71. DARWIN CMTY. LEGAL SERV., EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW: GAY AND LESBIAN LAW 
REFORM IN THE NT (2002), available at http://www.dcls.org.au/GayLesbian LawReform.htm 
(last visited June 22, 2007). This document was prompted by a community forum rather than 
any government-initiated inquiry, and drew heavily on the Western Australian Ministerial 
Advisory Committee Report.  
 72. See Millbank, supra note 3, at 30. 
 73. See Victoria Attorney-General’s Advisory Committee on Gay, Lesbian and 
Transgender Issues, Reducing Discrimination Against Same Sex Couples (2000). For a 
discussion of the Victorian process, see Miranda Stewart, It’s a Queer Thing: Campaigning for 
Equality and Social Justice for Lesbians and Gay Men, 29 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 75 (2004). 
 74. See DARWIN CMTY. LEGAL SERV., supra note 71. 
 75. ACT DEP’T OF JUSTICE & CMTY. SAFETY, Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender and 
Intersex People in the ACT: An Issues Paper (2002), available at http://www.jcs.act.gov.au/ 
elibrary/papers/same_sex_%20issues_paper.pdf (last visited June 22, 2007). 
 76. See JOINT STANDING COMM. ON CMTY. DEV., INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL RECOGNITION 
OF SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIPS 6–7 (2001); REMOVING LEGISLATIVE DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST SAME-SEX COUPLES (2003), available at www.sapo.org.au/binary282/Same.pdf. No 
recommendations were published, and the government moved directly to legislation. However, 
the legislation was then referred by the opposition to Parliamentary Committee.  
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VIII. THE “LAW OF SMALL CHANGE” 
Once New South Wales had passed its legislation in 1999, the 
other states and territories built upon and, in almost all cases, 
extended the reach of earlier reforms. This is consistent with a 
general global trend in same-sex relationship recognition described 
by Dutch expert Kees Waaldijk as “the law of small change.”77 
Waaldijk argues that across Europe there is a clear pattern of “steady 
progress” across “standard sequences” in each country, beginning 
with decriminalization of gay sex, setting an equal age of consent, the 
introduction of anti-discrimination protections for individuals, and 
then various incremental legislative changes recognizing same-sex 
partnerships and parenting.78 While such progress is not necessarily 
linear (for example, with backlash measures sometimes occurring 
simultaneously)79 and not always in the sequence identified by 
Waaldijk, in a federation such as Australia we can discern a similar 
overall trend. It is appropriate to consider the various state and 
territory jurisdictions in a cumulative sense as having built upon each 
others’ small changes to produce, in a remarkably short space of 
time, significant national change. 
New Zealand provides an interesting contrast to Australia in that it 
does not have the same context of historical broad-ranging 
recognition of unmarried heterosexual couples.80 While there were a 
range of recommendations for the introduction of a property division 
regime for unmarried heterosexual couples in New Zealand in the 
1980s and early 1990s, none was implemented.81 By the 1990s 
 
 77. Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the 
Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 64, at 437.  
 78. Id. at 439–42. 
 79. Indeed, it is arguable that no law reform processes are linear. For some discussion, see 
Margaret Davies, Legal Theory and Law Reform: Some Mainstream and Critical Approaches, 
28 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 168 (2003); Reg Graycar & Jenny Morgan, Law Reform: What’s in It for 
Women?, 23 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 393 (2005); Carol Smart, Feminism and Law: Some 
Problems of Analysis and Strategy, 14 INT’L J. SOC. L. 109 (1986); Margaret Thornton, 
Feminism and the Contradictions of Law Reform, 19 INT’L J. SOC. L. 453 (1991). 
 80. See Virginia Grainer, What’s Yours Is Mine: Reform of the Property Division Regime 
for Unmarried Couples in New Zealand, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 285, 297–98 (2002). 
 81. See Bill Atkin, The Challenge of Unmarried Cohabitation—The New Zealand 
Response, 37 FAM. L.Q. 303, 311 (2003) [hereinafter Atkin, Challenge]; Bill Atkin, Reforming 
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reform proposals came to address the situation of both heterosexual 
and same-sex couples, with a clear shift away from heterosexual 
unmarried couples to focus far more attention instead upon the legal 
position of same-sex couples.82 This is attributable, at least in part, to 
the government’s desire to ensure that legislation was consistent with 
the non-discrimination provisions in the Bill of Rights Act of 1990 
(which specifically recognizes sexual orientation, but which does not, 
as mentioned earlier, provide the ability to strike down inconsistent 
legislation).83 In the late 1990s a series of public discussion papers by 
the Ministry of Justice, augmented by the work of the Law 
Commission, placed on the agenda for discussion both an opt-in 
registration model and the extension of presumptive recognition for 
same-sex couples.84  
In 2001 New Zealand enacted a small set of reforms which 
granted rights, for the first time, to both same-sex and heterosexual 
de facto couples in the areas of property division and inheritance.85 
 
Property Division in New Zealand: From Marriage to Relationships, 3 EUR. J.L. REFORM 349, 
353–54 (2001) [hereinafter Atkin, Reforming]. 
 82. Indeed, the Law Commission argued openly that recognition of same-sex couples 
should take precedence:  
[T]here is a clear distinction between the position of same-sex partners on the one 
hand and opposite-sex de facto partners on the other. The latter (absent impediments to 
marriage such as an existing spouse) are unmarried as a matter of choice. The case for 
helping the former is much stronger because, as the law now stands, they have no such 
choice. 
LAW COMM’N OF N.Z., RECOGNISING SAME SEX RELATIONSHIPS, STUDY PAPER 4, at para. 19 
(1999), available at http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications/Publication_108_ 
277_SP4.pdf. 
 83. This project was called, somewhat disarmingly, Consistency 2000. See MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THE LAW 1 (1999), available at http://www.justice.govt.nz/ 
pubs/reports/1999/same_sex/discussion.pdf; Atkin, Challenge, supra note 81, at 314. 
 84. See Loader, supra note 70; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THE 
LAW–BACKGROUNDING THE ISSUES (1999), available at http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/ 
reports/1999/same-sex/samesex.pdf; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 83; In fact, presumptive 
status appears something of an afterthought in the latter report, with the last paragraph stating: 
Just as some heterosexual couples live in de facto relationships in preference to 
marrying so also some homosexual couples will prefer not to enter into registered 
partnerships. To the extent that the law regulates the affairs of those who abstain from 
formal relationships in this way the same rules should apply to same-sex as to 
opposite-sex couples. 
Id. § 33.4. 
 85. Property (Relationships) Amendment Act, 2001 (N.Z.). In 1999 harmonious rules for 
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While these measures were closely modeled on the 1999 New South 
Wales reforms,86 they provide a striking contrast with Australia in 
that the property division law was not a distinct regime separate from 
the “family law” system used for married couples; rather, it was 
unified with the marital regime, using principles of prima facie equal 
division.87 Equally notable is that this process was undertaken with 
two separate parliamentary votes: the first on the absorption of 
heterosexual de facto couples into the marital property regime, and 
the second on the extension of this reform to same-sex couples.88 
While the first vote was extremely close, the second passed with 
ease.89 This suggests that, unlike in Australia, opponents of the 
introduction of de facto status in New Zealand did view the abolition 
of distinctions between married and unmarried heterosexual couples 
as “downgrading” marriage.90 It is not clear why, but it is possible 
that because New Zealand is a unitary system, this change appeared 
to be much more dramatic and sudden (though it had been discussed 
for a long time), in contrast with Australia where the recognition of 
heterosexual de facto couples proceeded on a state-by-state basis over 
many years. Whatever the reason for the opposition to establishing de 
facto rights for heterosexual couples, once this had been achieved, 
there was little parliamentary opposition to the extension of that 
status to same-sex couples.91 
 
heterosexual and same-sex couples were introduced in immigration, which previously permitted 
same-sex partners of New Zealanders to apply, but on a different and more onerous basis than 
heterosexual partners. See David Ryken, Immigration Rights for Cohabitees in New Zealand, 
I.F.L. 18 (2004).  
 86. Similar or identical elements include: the definition of de facto relationships, the 
criteria to be used for determining the existence of a relationship, and the renaming of earlier 
legislation which used “marital” language, as the “Property (Relationships) Act.” See Atkin, 
Challenge, supra note 81, at 314–16; Grainer, supra note 80, at 303–04. 
 87. Grainer, supra note 80, at 304–08.  
 88. See Atkin, Reforming, supra note 81, at 354. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Note that although this extension of status in New Zealand was instantaneous, it took 
fifteen years in New South Wales, and longer elsewhere. For the history of de facto legislative 
reform of all Australian states and territories, see Millbank, supra note 3. The lack of a time lag 
in New Zealand is perhaps explained by the fact that the first reforms were occurring much later 
than heterosexual de facto status in Australia, and indeed at the same time as same-sex 
relationship recognition in Australia. As mentioned earlier, the 2001 New Zealand reforms 
drew upon the 1999 New South Wales reforms.  
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IX. OPT-IN RECOGNITION FOR COUPLES 
At the same time as Australian states and territories were creating 
presumption-based recognition models (from which it is possible to 
opt out by agreement),92 interest was also developing in the use of 
opt-in registration schemes in addition to, but not instead of, those 
models. Tasmania provides the clearest example: in 2003 it 
introduced a presumptive couple-based category and simultaneously 
introduced a registration system for couples.93 Registration is open to 
both same-sex and heterosexual couples.94 The differences in status 
for couples who register compared to those who do not are minimal,95 
with the major substantive difference being in eligibility to apply for 
second-parent adoption.96 Since registration opened on January 1, 
2004, only around sixty same-sex couples have registered.97 
In 2004 New Zealand extended its initial limited de facto 
relationship status to same-sex couples and heterosexual couples in 
all areas of law and simultaneously introduced a new form of civil 
union open to all couples.98 The express aim of these reforms was to 
 
 92. The De Facto Relationships Act of 1984 in New South Wales contained the first 
Australian legislative endorsement of cohabitation and separation agreements. See De Facto 
Relationships Act, 1984, §§ 44–47 (N.S.W.). Clearly, the intention was to allow people covered 
by ascription of status to opt out. These agreements were provided for considerably earlier than 
federal law rendered agreements made in contemplation of or during marriage enforceable. See 
Family Law Act, 1975 (Austl.).  
 93. Relationships Act, 2003, § 4(2) (Tas.). At the same time, Tasmania also introduced 
both forms of recognition for non-couples. After registration, a twenty-eight day “cooling off” 
period applies, in which either party may withdraw their consent to the registration. Id. § 13(1). 
 94. Id. § 4(1). 
 95. However, registration itself is proof of the existence of the relationship. Id. § 4(2). The 
other difference is that registering a relationship, like entering a marriage, automatically 
revokes one’s will. See Wills Act, 1992, § 20(2) (Tas). 
 96. Unregistered couples remain ineligible to apply to adopt children as a couple. 
Registered couples are eligible to apply, but only to a limited extent, as they may only adopt 
children who are related to one member of the couple. See Adoption Act, 1988, § 20(1), (2A) 
(Tas). 
 97. Telephone Interview with Tasmanian Registry of Births, Deaths, and Marriages (Jan. 
31, 2007). Registration started on January 1, 2004, and as of January 31, 2007, a total of 
seventy-nine significant relationships were registered. Of these, eighteen were heterosexual 
couples and sixty-one were same-sex couples. There was a relatively even gender breakdown, 
with thirty-two gay male couples and twenty-nine lesbian couples.  
 98. The first unions were celebrated on April 29, 2005. By January 31, 2007, civil union 
registrations totalled 721. These comprised 586 same-sex unions (268 male and 318 female), 
132 heterosexual unions, and three transfers of status for heterosexual couples from marriage to 
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treat all three forms of relationship status (de facto, civil unions, and 
marriages) as equal across New Zealand.99 Unlike the United 
Kingdom, but like the Netherlands, civil unions in New Zealand can 
be entered into by both heterosexual and same-sex couples, and 
heterosexual couples are able to convert a marriage into a union if 
they wish.100 This inclusiveness is premised on the idea that unions 
are not a “separate” or lesser status, but rather provide a choice of 
form of status (although the full range of choice is open only to 
heterosexual couples). The remaining difference in status in New 
Zealand is that all unmarried couples, whether parties of a civil union 
or de facto, remain ineligible to adopt children jointly.101  
Like three of the Australian jurisdictions (Western Australia, the 
Northern Territory, and the Australian Capital Territory), New 
Zealand also extended presumptive parental status to the consenting 
female partners of women who have children through any form of 
assisted reproductive technology.102 These reforms were retrospective 
in operation, granting a wide range of parental rights to the second 
parent in lesbian couples.103 
 
unions. Telephone Interview with New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, Registry of 
Births, Deaths, and Marriages (Jan. 31, 2007). 
 99. The New Zealand Ministry of Justice explained that the government’s objective was 
“to have neutral laws on relationships that apply across the board, whether those relationships 
are marriages, civil unions or de facto relationships.” New Zealand Ministry of Justice, Civil 
Union Bill & Relationships (Statutory References) Bill, http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/ 
reports/2004/civil-union-bill/index-relationship.html (last visited June 7, 2007); see also 
Cabinet Social Equity Committee, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples: Process and 
Legislative Options, http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/2004/civil-union-bill/cab-paper-
4.html (last visited June 7, 2007).  
 100. For the Netherlands, see Kees Waaldijk, Others May Follow: The Introduction of 
Marriage, Quasi-Marriage, and Semi-Marriage for Same-Sex Couples in European Countries, 
38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 569, 572–81 (2004); for the United Kingdom, see Carl Stychin, Not 
(Quite) a Horse and Carriage: The Civil Partnership Act 2004, 14 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 79 
(2006). 
 101. For background regarding unmarried couples and adoption, see N.Z. LAW COMM’N, 
ADOPTION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: A DIFFERENT APPROACH AND A NEW FRAMEWORK, 
REPORT 65 (2000). The report recommended that eligibility to apply for adoption not depend 
upon relationship status of any kind. Id. at ch. 13, para. 335. In the United Kingdom, all 
unmarried couples are eligible to adopt since December 30, 2005. Adoption and Children Act, 
2002, c. 38, § 144(4) (Eng.). 
 102. In New Zealand this model was first raised in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 83, 
and passed as part of the 2004 reforms, amending the Status of Children Act, 1969, § 18 (N.Z.).  
 103. See the discussion in Millbank, supra note 10. 
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Returning to Australia, in March 2006 the Australian Capital 
Territory government introduced a bill to enact a civil union regime, 
closely modeled on the New Zealand system, which would have been 
open to both same-sex and heterosexual couples.104 The territory’s 
Civil Unions Act never came into effect because, shortly after it was 
passed, the federal government disallowed it.105 While both the 
Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory have self-
government powers, enactments of either territory are vulnerable to 
being disallowed or overturned by the federal government.106 
However, this has occurred only rarely since the territories achieved 
self-government, once to overturn voluntary euthanasia legislation in 
the Northern Territory,107 and then to disallow civil unions. 
At the time of the Civil Union Act, the Australian Capital 
Territory had already passed comprehensive legislation treating 
same-sex couples as de facto partners108 and had gone further than 
states such as New South Wales and Victoria in securing parenting 
rights for same-sex families in a second raft of reforms.109 This round 
of reforms introduced, in addition to ascribed status for second 
parents in lesbian families formed through assisted conception, 
access to all forms of adoption for same-sex couples, and a regime to 
alter the legal parentage of children born through surrogacy.110 It is 
very striking indeed that the federal government chose to overrule the 
only element of the same-sex reforms that had virtually no legal 
effect. The sole additional legal right granted by civil unions in 
comparison with de facto status was that upon formalizing the 
 
 104. Civil Unions Act, 2006 (Austl. Cap. Terr.). 
 105. Under section 35 of the Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act, 1988 
(Austl.), the Governor-General (acting on instructions from the cabinet) may disallow any 
territory law six months after its enaction. The Act was disallowed on June 14, 2006. See 
Special Notice Gazette, S. 93 (June 14, 2006). 
 106. See the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution at section 122, which gives the 
federal parliament power to legislate for the territories.  
 107. See Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, 1995 (N. Terr.), invalidated by the Euthanasia 
Laws Bill, 1996 (Austl.), amending the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act, 1978 
(Austl.), by adding Item 1 of Schedule. 
 108. See supra note 49.  
 109. Note that Western Australia also included wide-ranging parenting rights. See 
Millbank, supra note 10. 
 110. See Parentage Act, 2004, § 24 (Austl. Cap. Terr.). For discussion, see Millbank, supra 
note 10. 
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relationship any earlier will of the parties was automatically 
invalidated.111 While the Act stated that civil unions were to be 
treated in the “same way” as marriage,112 this was only for the 
purposes of the law of the Australian Capital Territory (a small 
territory of around 300,000 people)113; it had no effect on the laws of 
other states or on federal law. Symbolism, rather than substantive 
rights, was the issue. The federal government’s objection was that the 
Act “said” that same-sex and heterosexual unions were the “same 
thing.”114 What the Act actually did was irrelevant; the important 
political point was to repudiate any claim to “sameness.”  
This suggests a further trend that mirrors international 
developments; a shift away from substantive legal rights as the main 
issue, toward a focus on naming, symbolism, and the “special-ness” 
of marriage. We discuss this emphasis on terminology and discourse 
further below. 
X. MARRIAGE AS THE COMPARATOR 
Even though marriage was not explicitly a focus of the Australian 
reform campaigns of the 1990s, it is interesting to reflect on the 
extent to which marriage still appeared as a comparator to be 
emulated, avoided, or distinguished as “special.” These concerns 
emerge from the choice of language used to denote and define couple 
relationships in the reform legislation (for example, the use of terms 
 
 111. Civil Unions Act, 2006, sched. 1, pt. 1.29 (Austl. Cap. Terr.). 
 112. The original Civil Unions Bill, 2006, § 5(2) (Austl. Cap. Terr.), stated: “A civil union 
is to be treated for all purposes under territory law in the same way as a marriage.” This was 
altered in an attempt to appease the federal government, so the Civil Unions Act, 2006, §5(2) 
(Austl. Cap. Terr.), stated: “A civil union is different to a marriage but is to be treated for all 
purposes under territory law in the same way as a marriage.” 
 113. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Population by Age and Sex, Australian Capital 
Territory (2005), http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/3235.8.55.001Main+ 
Features1Jun%202005?OpenDocument (last visited June 22, 2007) (estimating a population of 
325,000). 
 114. “[T]he Bill is plainly an attempt to mimic marriage under the misleading title of civil 
unions.” ABC Radio Interview with Prime Minister Howard, June 7, 2006, http://www.pm. 
gov.au/media/Interview/2006/Interview1967.cfm (last visited June 22, 2007). “[T]he legislation 
by its own admission is an attempt to equate civil unions with marriage and we don’t find that 
acceptable.” Prime Minister Howard, Press Conference (June 6, 2006), available at http://www. 
pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2006/Interview1966.cfm (last visited June 22, 2007). 
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such as “marriage-like relationship”).115 While these choices of 
terminology can, on one level, be characterized as semantic, on 
another level they are extremely revealing about the ongoing 
symbolic place of marriage in a legal context in which, for all 
practical purposes, marriage is legally irrelevant. 
At the time of the various same-sex law reform debates in 
Australia the existing law contained a multitude of definitions of 
“spouse” in the context of defining heterosexual unmarried couples. 
Various forms of words were used to denote couples, such as living 
together “in a marriage-like relationship,” or living “as the husband 
or wife of that person.” In these formulations, “marriage” was the 
express comparator, while “spouse” remained the central category for 
“a member of a couple,” albeit one that included a de facto spouse. 
To what extent, then, did the coverage of same-sex couples in these 
regimes involve reinforcing marriage as a comparator? 
The 1999 New South Wales amendments dropped the term 
“spouse” which was previously used (i.e “de facto spouse”) and 
replaced it with “partner” or “relationship” to emphasize semantically 
the difference between marriage and same-sex partnerships. There are 
two very different ways to view this. On the one hand, avoiding the 
word “spouse” was an open attempt to appease opponents of reform 
who argued that it was, in effect, “same-sex marriage.”116 The New 
South Wales law expressly proceeded on the basis that this was a 
form of recognition that was “Not Marriage”.117 A number of other 
jurisdictions followed this trend, removing the word “spouse” from 
the term “de facto spouse.”118 Heterosexual unmarried relationships 
are accorded legal recognition because they are “like” married 
 
 115. See, for example, the definition of a de facto relationship in Western Australia as “a 
relationship (other than a legal marriage) between 2 persons who live together in a marriage-
like relationship.” Interpretation Act, 1984, § 13A(1) (W. Austl.). The definition of a de facto 
relationship in the Northern Territory also includes the terminology of “marriage-like.” De 
Facto Relationships Act, 1991, § 3A(1)-(3) (N. Terr.). 
 116. See Jenni Millbank & Kathy Sant, A Bride in Her Every-Day Clothes: Same Sex 
Relationship Recognition in NSW, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 181 (2000).  
 117. See Property (Relationships) Act, 1984, § 62 (N.S.W.) (“Nothing in the Property 
(Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 is to be taken to approve, endorse or initiate 
any change in the marriage relationship, which by law must be between persons of the opposite 
sex, nor entitle any person to seek to adopt a child unless otherwise entitled to by law.”). 
 118. Millbank, supra note 3, at 11, 19, 22. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 121 Graycar Millbank book pages.doc  9/26/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
146 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 24:121 
 
 
relationships, same-sex relationships are then granted rights because 
they are “like” heterosexual unmarried relationships, but through a 
discursive sleight of hand (via the disappearance of the word 
“spouse”), same-sex relationships are not “like” marriage.  
However, there is another way to read some of these choices of 
terminology, independently of the desire to appease conservative 
opponents. Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory did not 
simply distance same-sex couples from marriage, but actually 
removed the category of spouse as the central relationship category in 
all of its laws.119 They instead used the term “domestic partner” as 
the universal category, of which spouse (including married couples) 
became a subset.120 This marks a shift in the traditional hierarchical 
construction of relationships in law. Marriage is removed from the 
literal and metaphorical center and is no longer the benchmark 
against which other relationships must be compared and be deemed 
similar in order to be included. Rather, married spouses become just 
one example of a number of different options under the larger entity 
of couples.121 This was considered subversive, as evidenced by the 
express opposition of some conservative legislators who, while not 
opposing the substantive reforms in their own jurisdictions, 
vigorously opposed the changes in terminology that removed married 
spouses from being a separately named category of relationship.122  
 
 119. Id. at 15, 31. 
 120. The original South Australian Bill also did so. See Statutes Amendment (Relationships) 
Bill, 2004, § 66(2) (S. Austl.).  
 121. This is not to suggest that the government necessarily intended such a subversive 
interpretative or that more regressive interpretations are not open. In the second reading speech 
for the Victorian reforms, the Attorney-General appeared to reaffirm the “special-ness” of 
marriage:  
In recognizing non-heterosexual relationships in a non-discriminatory way, this bill 
does not encroach on the status of marriage. Indeed, quite the contrary. 
It does treat non-marriage relationships without discrimination on the basis of gender 
or sexual orientation, but it does not alter the definition of spouse in state legislation. 
Or rather, it restores the definition of spouse to its original meaning, as a party to a 
marriage, and removes the various extended definitions in some statutes which had 
blurred that meaning.  
Victoria, Legislative Assembly Hansard 23 Nov. 2000, at 1911 (Rob Hulls). 
 122. In speaking on the 2003 reforms in the Australian Capital Territory, the Liberal Party 
stated that they supported the main aim of “removing discrimination,” but objected to the use of 
“domestic partner” as the generic term for all couple relationships, believing that to do so would 
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By contrast, both Western Australia and the Northern Territory 
continued to center marriage as the core relationship category, but at 
the same time did not retreat from equating same-sex couples to 
married couples, at least linguistically. Those jurisdictions retained 
the original form of words for a de facto relationship as “between 
[two] persons who live together in a marriage-like relationship,” 
including same-sex couples.123 Although continuing to center 
marriage, this, too, had its own subversive element, through 
dissolving the discursive barrier between same-sex couples and the 
“special” status of marriage that had been so carefully preserved 
elsewhere.  
XI. “BEYOND CONJUGALITY”124: RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS  
FOR NON-COUPLES  
As mentioned above, there has been considerable interest in a 
form of recognition of “non-conjugal” relationships in Australia. 
However, from the time the GLRL raised these concerns, based 
largely on the idea of relationships of “significant emotional 
interdependence” and “chosen family” within a marginalized 
community,125 this form of recognition, and the groups to whom it 
might be accorded, has changed dramatically.  
Although the GLRL proposed a form of non-couple recognition in 
New South Wales in 1993, the Australian Capital Territory was the 
first to introduce this category into Australian law.126 The Australian 
 
“lump marriage in with other forms of relationship” and not “acknowledge the special status of 
marriage.” See Australian Capital Territory, Legislative Assembly Hansard 11 Mar. 2003, 839 
(Brendan Smyth). 
 123. Interpretation Act, 1984, § 13A(1) (W. Austl.); De Facto Relationships Act, 1991, 
§ 3A(1) (N. Terr.). 
 124. This was the title used by the Law Commission of Canada (LCC) for its 2001 report 
on “close personal relationships.” See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 35. Note that 
relatively recently, U.S. scholars such as Nancy Polikoff have written about the LCC’s 
approach. See, e.g., Polikoff, supra note 35. In July 2006 the Beyond Marriage Coalition cited 
that report with approval in their official statement. BEYOND MARRIAGE BEYOND SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE: A NEW STRATEGIC VISION FOR ALL OUR FAMILIES & RELATIONSHIPS (2006), 
www.beyondmarriage.org/BeyondMarriage.pdf. 
 125. See GAY & LESBIAN RIGHTS LOBBY, supra note 31, at 22–29. Note that this original 
proposal was also intended to cover non-biological children. 
 126. Domestic Relationships Act, 1994 (Austl. Cap. Terr.). 
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Capital Territory broke new ground when, in 1994, it enacted the 
Domestic Relationships Act, which introduced a category of 
domestic relationship that did not require parties to be in a sexual 
relationship or to cohabit.127 The definition was of a “personal 
relationship between [two] adults in which one provides personal or 
financial commitment and support of a domestic nature for the 
material benefit of the other.”128 Ultimately, this definition was used 
only in a single Act. While this Act remains in force, later legislation 
in the Australian Capital Territory retreated from this broad approach. 
The 2003 same-sex reforms use the category “domestic partner,” but 
the definition in that legislation expressly requires the parties to be a 
cohabiting couple.129  
The 1999 New South Wales amendments created a new category 
of “close personal relationship.”130 This was intended to cover close 
cohabiting relationships of interdependence across a small number of 
laws.131 The amendments define this category of relationship as “a 
close personal relationship (other than a marriage or a de facto 
relationship) between two adult persons, whether or not related by 
family, who are living together, one or each of whom provides the 
other with domestic support and personal care.”132  
Unlike the Australian Capital Territory’s Domestic Relationships 
Act, the New South Wales category requires cohabitation.133 The last 
aspect of the definition, “personal care,” soon came to be seen as a 
means of narrowing the application of the category. In most of the 
 
 127. Id. § 3(1) 
 128. Id.  
 129. Legislation Act, 2001, § 169(2) (Austl. Cap. Terr.). 
 130. Property (Relationships) Act, 1984, § 5(1)(b) (N.S.W.). 
 131. Bail Act, 1978 (N.S.W.); Coroners Act, 1980 (N.S.W.); Duties Act, 1997 (N.S.W.); 
Family Provision Act, 1982 (N.S.W.); Trustee Act, 1925 (N.S.W.).  
 132. Property (Relationships) Act, 1984, § 5(1)(b). Section 5(2) clarifies that: 
For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), a close personal relationship is taken not to exist 
between two persons where one of them provides the other with domestic support and 
personal care: 
 (a) for fee or reward, or 
 (b) on behalf of another person or an organization (including a government or 
government agency, a body corporate or a charitable or benevolent organization).  
Id. § 5.2. 
 133. Property (Relationships) Act, 1984, § 5(1)(b). 
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small number of cases in which it has been at issue, New South 
Wales courts have held that “personal care” requires “assistance with 
mobility, personal hygiene and physical comfort.”134 Few able-
bodied adults would require such assistance, effectively turning the 
category into one addressing only (unpaid) live-in caregivers. 
In 2003 Tasmania also passed legislation that created a non-
couple category of “caring relationship,” but this category does not 
require cohabitation.135 Both couples and those in non-couple “caring 
relationships” may register their relationships.136 Unregistered caring 
relationships are legally recognized only in a very limited number of 
Acts.137 Once registered, caring relationships give rise to a slightly 
wider range of entitlements, but still far fewer than those to which 
registered couples are entitled.138 Registration started on January 1, 
2004, and as of January 31, 2007, there were no caring relationships 
 
 134. Dridi v. Fillmore (2001) N.S.W.S.C. 319, at para. 108 (unreported). The Master in 
Dridi repeated this holding in a family provision case. See Devonshire v. Hyde (2002) 
N.S.W.S.C. 30 (unreported). This approach was approved in Hinde v. Bush, (2002) N.S.W.S.C. 
828 (unreported), but was not referred to in the family provision case of Przewoznik v. Scott, 
(2005) N.S.W.S.C. 74 (unreported), where the Master held that a heterosexual relationship that 
did not manifest sufficient mutual commitment to satisfy the requirements of the de facto 
relationship category was in fact sufficient to qualify as a close personal relationship. In a 
marked departure from the earlier cases that suggest the category is still ill-defined, the court 
held that the “dividing point” between de facto and close personal relationships lay in “the 
degree of mutual commitment and interdependence.” Id. at para. 18. 
 135. Relationships Act, 2003, § 5 (Tas.). “A caring relationship is a relationship other than 
a marriage or significant relationship between two adult persons whether or not related by 
family, one or each of whom provides the other with domestic support and personal care.” Id. 
The New South Wales criteria for determining the existence of a couple relationship were also 
adopted for this category, with three variations. The criteria of “whether or not a sexual 
relationship exists” and “care and support of children” were dropped from the list, and the 
additional criterion of “the level of personal care and domestic support provided by one or each 
of the parties to each other” was inserted. Id. § 5(5)(h). 
 136. Id. § 11. 
 137. Unregistered caring relationships are recognized only in five acts and regulations: 
Criminal Justice (Mental Impairment) Act, 1999 (Tas.); Motor Accidents (Liabilities and 
Compensation) Regulations, 2000 (Tas.); State Service Regulations, 2001 (Tas.); War Service 
Land Settlement Act, 1950 (Tas.); and the Workers’ (Occupational Diseases) Relief Fund Act, 
1954 (Tas.).  
 138. So, for instance, someone in a registered caring relationship is eligible to inherit under 
intestacy provisions and apply for property and maintenance settlements at the end of a 
relationship, while someone who is unregistered is not. Before registration of a caring 
relationship, each party must have received independent legal advice. See Millbank, supra note 
3, at 27. 
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registered in Tasmania.139 The lack of popularity of this option raises 
the possibility that such rights are not needed, although this lack of 
use may also point to other possibilities, such as insufficient public 
knowledge.140 
XII. FROM BREAKING DOWN HETERONORMATIVITY TO VALORIZING 
“SPINSTER SISTERS”141 
The original conception of a non-couple category was intended as 
a progressive gesture, to make a break from a hierarchical pattern of 
relationship rights with marriage at the top.142 In doing so, it arguably 
had the potential to destabilize heteronormativity and the hetero-
nuclear family itself. However, in recent years, the use of and 
discourse around non-couple recognition has changed dramatically in 
Australia. Indeed, it has been, arguably, completely “captured” by 
conservative opponents of gay and lesbian equality movements who 
now promote it—in a very different light—as their own reform 
agenda.  
The opposition in South Australia denied that its vigorous pursuit 
of a non-couple alternative was a “smoke screen” or “road block”.143 
Yet it is notable that the two jurisdictions most resistant to same-sex 
relationship recognition reforms, South Australia and the federal 
parliament, have been the ones to most firmly center a (desexed and 
degendered) category of “interdependence” in recent years.144  
 
 139. Telephone Interview with the Tasmanian Registry of Births, Deaths, and Marriages 
(Jan. 31, 2007). 
 140. See Millbank, supra note 49 (arguing that, especially when it comes to property 
related laws, non-couples are far less likely than couples to need, and to seek, legal 
interventions). 
 141. Note that Stychin refers, in the context of the United Kingdom debates, to the 
“increasingly famous” spinster sisters. Stychin, supra note 100, at 84. This reference was made 
some years prior to the European Court of Human Rights claim brought by an actual pair of 
spinster sisters, discussed below. 
 142. See The Bride Wore Pink, supra note 28; GAY & LESBIAN RIGHTS LOBBY, supra note 
31. 
 143. South Australia, Legislative Council Hansard 29 June 2005, at 2226 (T.G. Cameron). 
 144. In their analysis of the parliamentary debates leading to the legalization of “same sex 
marriage” in Canada, Young & Boyd also note the divergence between the original progressive 
arguments for moving away from “prioritizing relationships with a sexual tie” and the more 
recent arguments of conservatives who have attempted to “desex and render invisible lesbian 
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In 1995 the category of “interdependent relationship” was first 
introduced in federal law in the area of immigration, but only for the 
limited purpose of partner reunification.145 While this does not 
expressly apply to couples, the category requires “a mutual 
commitment to a shared life to the exclusion of any spouse 
relationships or any other interdependent relationships,”146 and 
includes criteria that largely reflect those used in state laws to 
determine the existence of a de facto relationship.147  
In 2004, after nearly a decade of pressure to change the law 
governing pensions to recognize same-sex couples so that surviving 
partners are able to receive death benefits, federal law was amended 
to include the new and separate category of “interdependent 
relationship.”148 There are mixed messages in the legislation as to 
whether this is a couple-based category. While the definition mirrors 
the New South Wales non-couple category of “close personal 
relationship,” the list of mandatory criteria for determining the 
existence of any relationship essentially reflects the criteria used in 
New South Wales for de facto couples.149 It seems clear that the 
interdependent category in federal law was intended to cover, but 
pointedly not to name as such, same-sex couples. This move reflects 
what Gail Mason has called the “social and political hush that has 
historically enveloped the subject of same-sex sexuality.”150  
What is noteworthy is that these reforms, while extending rights to 
same-sex couples, went to considerable lengths to pass them off as 
for or about someone else,151 in a similar way that lesbians and gay 
 
and gay relationships by conflating relationships based on sexual intimacy with other non-
sexual familial relationships.” See Boyd & Young, supra note 35, at 19. 
 145. Migration Regulations, 1994, § 1.09A (Austl.). By 2006 the operation of this category 
was extended to only one other kind of visa, a temporary skilled migrant visa. MILLBANK, 
supra note 6, at 74–75.  
 146. Migration Regulations, 1994, § 1.09A(2)(c)(i).  
 147. Id. § 1.09A(5), (6); see MILLBANK, supra note 6. 
 148. Miranda Stewart, ‘Are You Two Interdependent?’ Family, Property and Same-Sex 
Couples in Australia’s Superannuation Regime, 28 SYDNEY L. REV. 437 (2006). 
 149. Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations, 1994, § 1.04AAAA (Austl.).  
 150. GAIL MASON, THE SPECTACLE OF VIOLENCE: HOMOPHOBIA, GENDER, AND 
KNOWLEDGE 78–79 (2002). 
 151. See, for example, comments made by Attorney-General Philip Ruddock: 
[T]here has been almost a preoccupation on the part of some in relation to one element 
of the package that the government announced. I would simply make this point: the 
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men may be accepted if they “pass” for straight, or if they are 
acknowledged but nonetheless “discreet” about their identity.152 
Writing on the phenomenon of “passing,” Mason asserts: 
“Cumulatively, these kinds of engagements with homosexuality 
produce not so much a ubiquitous or universal exclusion, but a 
pervasive atmosphere of inarticulation or silence.”153 The same could 
be said of federal law reform in Australia to date. 
In contrast, South Australia’s use of a non-couple category, rather 
than being a smokescreen for “discreet” same-sex couple recognition, 
was instead promoted as an active and alternative project of the 
conservative opposition.154 This trend echoes developments in 
Canada and the United Kingdom. Boyd and Young have noted that 
the Law Commission of Canada’s progressively motivated proposal 
to move away from granting rights on the basis of spousal status 
toward emotional and economic interdependence was quickly taken 
up by religious and conservative opponents as an argument to deny 
spousal status to same-sex couples, because such rights could then be 
tagged as “unfair” to others.155 Likewise, in the United Kingdom, 
conservative opponents of civil partnership legislation attempted to 
amend the legislation to cover “family members and carers.”156 What 
these debates reveal is the way in which the non-couple category has 
been co-opted by opponents of equality using formal equality rhetoric 
and false comparators (same-sex couples with same-sex non-
couples)157 in order to position themselves as the ultimate equality 
 
amendment to the legislation that the government is proposing is not about same-sex 
couples; it is about interdependent relationships.  
Australia, House of Representatives Hansard 17 June 2004, at 30,758 (Philip Ruddock). 
 152. Peter Dutton, Minister for Revenue, stated that “amending the definition of 
‘dependent’ will not alter the definition of ‘spouse’ and will not specifically recognize same-sex 
relationships.” Australia, House of Representatives Hansard 16 June 2004, at 30,557 (Peter 
Dutton). 
 153. See MASON, supra note 150, at 81. 
 154. For discussion, see supra note 63. 
 155. See Boyd & Young, supra note 35, at 225–26. 
 156. See Stychin, supra note 100, at 80–81. 
 157. Note that in the first reported Australian case to deal with sexuality discrimination, the 
claim that exclusion of two gay couples from a work roster open to married and unmarried 
heterosexual couples was dismissed on the basis that the sexuality of the complainants was 
irrelevant to the conduct. The tribunal held that the partners “may have been brothers each 
conducting separate heterosexual relationships . . . [or] golfing buddies wishing to play golf in 
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seekers. While it is typical of opponents of same-sex relationship 
recognition to characterize any form of legal change as “social 
engineering”158 and as an “attack” on marriage,159 what is remarkable 
about this particular strategy is that it reconfigures same-sex 
relationship reforms as actually worsening rather than alleviating 
inequality and discrimination, through the construction of another 
(more) deserving and unrecognized group, the “domestic co-
dependants.”  
Despite there being no empirical evidence to demonstrate an 
unmet legal need for broadly based recognition of non-couple 
relationships, nor any form of political or social mobilizing by non-
couples, this group has been constructed as a key figure of need and 
exclusion in the debates. In parliamentary debates across a variety of 
jurisdictions, this group has come to be represented as fantasy figures 
of asexual altruism. Whether they were the real or imagined 
constituents of Members of Parliament who spoke on the topic in 
Australia, domestic co-dependants were usually elderly and almost 
always either unmarried daughters caring for elderly fathers, or two 
women who had lived together for “twenty years.”160 In each of these 
 
an overseas port—nevertheless they would not have been permitted to join the scheme.” Wilson 
& Anor v. Qantas Airways (1985) E.O.C. 92–141, at 76,398. This argument was again made in 
Hope v. NIB, where a health fund contended that there had been no discrimination by virtue of a 
“comparison of the treatment of the [complainants] with that of a hypothetical ‘three males 
living together sharing expenses’.” Hope v. NIB Health Fund Ltd. (1995) E.O.C. 92-716, at 
76,021. The Equal Opportunity Tribunal (and subsequently the New South Wales Supreme 
Court) although “doubting” Wilson, did not directly overrule it. The Supreme Court did so 
indirectly however by holding: 
[T]he requisite comparison is not one between the actual treatment of the 
[complainants], a homosexual couple living in a domestic relationship, and their 
hypothetical treatment if they were not homosexual, namely if they were two 
heterosexual men living together. To undertake such a comparison would simply be to 
ignore the statutory requirement of the “the same or not materially different 
circumstances” and, indeed, in my opinion, subvert the purpose and object of the Act: 
NIB Health Funds Ltd. v. Hope & Anor, 1996 NSW LEXIS 3962 (N.S.W.S.C. Nov. 15, 
1996). 
 158. This is also a feature of the New Zealand debates on civil unions. See Nan Seuffert, 
Sexual Citizenship and the Civil Union Act 2004, 37 VICTORY UNIV. WELLINGTON L. REV. 281 
(2006).  
 159. See, for example, the federal government’s decision to overturn the Civil Unions Act, 
2006 (Austl. Cap. Terr.), presented in a press release by the Attorney-General entitled 
“Commonwealth to Defend Marriage Against Territory Laws.” (June 6, 2006). 
 160. See Millbank & Morgan, supra note 65.  
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stories the figures of need were women who were carefully 
desexualized; they were elderly sisters,161 or they worked for 
religious organizations, or knew each other through church. One 
member of Parliament went as far as to state: “It is unfortunate and 
probably best described as the dark side of the human condition that 
some people will always be tempted to murmur about the status of a 
relationship of two persons of the same sex.”162  
Once these “spinster sisters” are placed alongside same-sex 
couples as the “rightful” comparator, it is then but a small step to 
argue that reforms granting same-sex couple rights in fact privilege 
sexual licentiousness over love and loyalty: “[T]o confuse one’s 
sexuality and sexual peccadilloes with dependence is a nonsense.”163 
This allows opposition members to characterize relationship reforms as 
granting “special rights” to same-sex couples, rewarding them for 
having sex, while the charity-minded spinsters miss out.164  
The discursive centering of the non-couple category also serves to 
reconfigure gay men and lesbians as not just a privileged group, but 
as themselves the cause of discrimination. One South Australian 
member of Parliament claimed that it is “hypocritical that a group can 
push and obtain their rights at the expense of other people’s rights.”165  
It is particularly ironic, given the invention of the hypothetical 
morally deserving aged and sexless spinster sisters in these debates, 
that a claim was actually brought against the United Kingdom in the 
 
 161. See, e.g., John Howard, Prime Minister, Press Conference (May 27, 2004), 
http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2004/Interview889.cfm (last visited June 22, 2007); 
Australia, House of Representatives Hansard 16 June 2004, at 30,557 (Peter Dutton). In the 
English debates, the sisters also featured heavily. See, e.g., House of Commons Hansard 9 Nov. 
2004, at 15. 
 162. South Australia, House of Assembly Hansard 1 Dec. 2005, at 4399 (Joe Scalzi). 
Similarly, in the 1999 New South Wales reforms, an opposition member of Parliament struggled 
for an example of a non-couple relationship, and produced, “two female deaconesses who are living 
together” (and who, he stressed, after laughter from the public gallery, have a relationship with “no 
sexual element”). New South Wales, Legislative Assembly Hansard 6 June 1999, at 742 (Malcom 
Kerr); see Millbank & Sant, supra note 116. 
 163. South Australia, House of Assembly Hansard 21 Aug. 2002, at 1212 (Mitch 
Williams). 
 164. South Australia, House of Assembly Hansard 6 July 2005, at 3137 (Joe Scalzi); South 
Australia, House of Assembly Hansard 28 Oct. 2004, at 690 (Joe Scalzi); South Australia, 
Legislative Council Hansard 2 Apr. 2003, at 2076 (Andrew Evans). 
 165. South Australia, House of Assembly Hansard 16 Oct. 2002, at 1566 (Joe Scalzi).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/7
p 121 Graycar Millbank book pages.doc  9/26/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters 155 
 
 
European Court of Human Rights by two such elderly sisters.166 Their 
claim was based upon their exclusion from the new civil partnerships 
regime in the United Kingdom, making them ineligible for inheritance 
tax exemptions available to civil partners.167 The claim was narrowly 
rejected by the court, which decided (in a four to three decision) that 
there was no discrimination against them as their situation was not 
analogous to that of a married couple or of civil partners.168 However, 
just as in the discussion above, the claim itself and the minority 
judgments of the court obliterate from view the ubiquity of legal 
privilege that has long been accorded to heterosexual coupledom at the 
expense of other forms of relationships.169 
Both openly and subconsciously, conservative opponents of same-
sex equality claims have used the interdependency category as a way 
of “othering” lesbian and gay couple relationships, while 
simultaneously capturing the discourse of non-discrimination.170 
 
 166. Unusually, the Court accepted the case although no domestic litigation had been 
undertaken. The sisters had written to the Chancellor before the Budget every year for thirty 
years asking for reform of the inheritance tax laws to recognize siblings on the same basis as 
married couples. See Joanna Bale, Sisters Begin Battle over Inheritance Tax Rights, TIMES 
(London), Sept. 4, 2006, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/money/tax/ 
article627513.ece (last visited June 22, 2007). They “decided to act” after the Civil Partnerships 
Act was passed. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Burden & Burden v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1064. 
The court said: “The State cannot be criticised for pursuing, though its taxation system, policies 
designed to promote marriage; nor can it be criticised for making available the fiscal advantages 
attendant on marriage to committed homosexual couples.” Id. at para. 59.  
 169. In an echo of many of the themes discussed above, numerous news articles refer to the 
fact that the sisters were altruistic caregivers for other family members, and that their father (the 
original purchaser of the house in question), worked his entire life in the church. See, e.g., id.; 
Claire Marshall, ‘Why Must We Lose Our Home?’, BBC NEWS, Sept. 12, 2006, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5336760.stm (last visited June 22, 2007); Janet Daley, The Evil of 
Inheritance Tax Lies in Punishing the Thrifty, TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 4, 2006, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2006/09/04/do0401.xml (last 
visited June 22, 2007).  
Joyce Burden said she thought people like her were deliberately excluded from the 
recent Civil Partnership Act because there were so many homosexuals in Parliament. 
“I don’t have the status of a lesbian,” she said. “This is an insult to single people who 
have looked after elderly parents. I don’t call that justice.” 
Joshua Rozenberg, Sisters Go to Court Over ‘Gay Bias’ in Tax Laws, TELEGRAPH (London), 
Sept. 2, 2006, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/09/ 
02/nherit02.xml (last visited June 22, 2007). 
 170. See Boyd & Young, supra note 35. A South Australian member of Parliament stated: 
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Equality-deniers are able to claim that they are “strongly in favour of 
removing any property and other discrimination that exists against 
people who have same-sex relationships”171 without specifically 
according same-sex couples any rights at all. 
XIII. BEYOND FORMAL EQUALITY?  
As noted above, unlike the laws that have developed in jurisdictions 
such as Massachusetts, Canada, and South Africa,172 the Australian 
legislation was not prompted by litigation. Australia is now the only 
western democratic nation that does not have some form of a Bill of 
Rights, either in a constitutional form or even as a non-entrenched 
statutory version such as that in New Zealand.173 The absence of a 
constitutional equality guarantee174 has meant that, unlike in the 
United States and Canada in particular, litigation in Australia and 
New Zealand has not been a favored, or even particularly useful, 
strategy for effecting relationship recognition for same-sex couples. 
The few attempts at litigation in Australia, usually claims to family 
and spousal benefits brought under anti-discrimination laws, have 
had mixed results, while challenges to the statutes that confer rights 
 
Of the three relationship types under discussion—namely, heterosexual de facto, same-
sex and domestic co-dependant—same-sex and domestic co-dependant are the most 
similar. In fact, removing the sexual activity dimension, they are virtually identical. . . . 
The characteristics of [same-sex] relationships have far more in common with 
domestic co-dependants and are, by definition, a subset of this grouping.  
South Australia, House of Assembly Hansard 1 Dec. 2005, at 4399 (Joe Scalzi) (emphasis 
added).  
 171. John Howard, Prime Minister, Press Conference, Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Offices, Sydney (Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2005/ 
Interview1735.cfm (last visited June 22, 2007). 
 172. See supra note 14. 
 173. For critical discussion see, for example, CHARLESWORTH, supra note 12. In recent 
years this has provoked some state and territory governments to enact their own local versions. 
See supra note 12. However, they are very limited in operation and, moreover, have no impact 
on national law.  
 174. See Reg Graycar & Jenny Morgan, Feminist Legal Theory and Understandings of 
Equality: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 399 (2005); Jenny 
Morgan, Equality Rights in the Australian Context: A Feminist Assessment, in TOWARDS AN 
AUSTRALIAN BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 123; cf. Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 
C.L.R. 1 (Austl.); Kable v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions for N.S.W. (1996) 189 C.L.R. 51; Leeth v. 
Commonwealth (1992) 174 C.L.R. 455 (Austl.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/7
p 121 Graycar Millbank book pages.doc  9/26/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters 157 
 
 
or benefits based upon “spousal” status have universally failed.175 In 
New Zealand a challenge to the exclusivity of the Marriage Act was 
unanimously dismissed.176 The limited ability to strike down statutes 
on constitutional grounds,177 the frequent use of gendered definitions 
within statutes (such as the terms “husband,” “wife,” and the narrow 
interpretation of “spouse”),178 and a general tendency to be cautious 
about “law-making,”179 have all tempered judicial creativity in 
statutory interpretation and, in turn, discouraged court challenges. 
It could be suggested, perhaps somewhat controversially, or 
perhaps even heretically, that the absence of a constitutional 
guarantee of equality in Australia has enabled the debate in that 
country to bypass, and indeed transcend, some of the limits of the 
language of equality, or at least the language of formal equality, 
leaving the legislature a clean slate upon which to draw recognition 
regimes.180 For example, the Supreme Court of Canada’s remedy in 
the 1999 lesbian spousal support case, M v. H,181 (directing the 
 
 175. See Harman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Soc. Sec. (1998) 3 S.S.R. 19 (Austl.); Rohner & Anor 
v. Scanlan & Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 1006 F.C.A. (Austl.); 
Commonwealth v. Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Comm’n (1998) E.O.C. 92-932 
(Austl.); Brown v. Comm’r for Superannuation (1995) 38 A.L.D. 344 (Austl.). 
 176. Quilter v. Attorney-Gen., [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523 (C.A.); see also Andrew Butler, 
Same-Sex Marriage and Freedom from Discrimination in New Zealand, 1998 PUB. LAW 396; 
Janet McLean, Legislative Invalidation, Human Rights Protection and s 4 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act, 4 N.Z. L. REV. 421 (2001); Paul Rishworth, Reflections on the Bill of Rights 
after Quilter v. Attorney-General, N.Z. U. L. REV. 683 (1998). 
 177. Note that under section 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution, when there is a 
conflict between state legislation and federal legislation, the latter prevails. So state acts 
inconsistent with federal discrimination legislation are, to the extent of any inconsistency, 
invalid or inoperative under section 109 of the Constitution. On this basis, the refusal by the 
state of Victoria to allow single women and lesbians access to assisted reproductive services 
was held to be inconsistent with the federal Sex Discrimination Act, 1984 (Austl.), which 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of marital status. See McBain v. Victoria (2000) 99 F.C.R. 
116 (Austl.). The High Court of Australia refused to review the decision on the grounds of 
standing. Ex Parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference (2002) 209 C.L.R. 372 (Austl.). 
 178. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. HREOC & Muller (1998) E.O.C. 92-931, at 78, 207 
(Austl.); Brown, 38 A.L.D. 344. 
 179. See, for example, the extra curial discussions by two current High Court judges. 
Dyson Heydon, Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law, 47 QUADRANT 9 (2003); 
Michael Kirby, Beyond the Judicial Fairy Tales, 48 QUADRANT 26 (2004) (responding to 
Heydon). 
 180. For an argument that legislative processes are equally susceptible to formal equality 
discourses, see Boyd & Young, supra note 35, at 767–70.  
 181. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 121 Graycar Millbank book pages.doc  9/26/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
158 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 24:121 
 
 
province of Ontario to change as many statutes as necessary in order 
to comply with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ equality 
guarantee), is more far reaching than anything with which we are 
familiar in Australia’s constitutional repertoire. It is unlikely that a 
court-initiated or litigation-based approach would ever have resulted 
in legislation such as the Australian laws that accord rights to people 
in non-cohabiting or non-conjugal relationships. Specifically, a 
formal equality model may well have resulted in the first arm of the 
New South Wales reforms (the extension of de facto relationship 
status to same-sex couples), but it is unlikely ever to have resulted in 
simultaneous recognition of non-couple relationships.  
Because equality challenges are premised upon a comparator, they 
will always to some degree be limited by that comparator.182 This 
seems to be the case even in jurisdictions such as Canada, where 
equality jurisprudence has embraced a more substantive than formal 
approach to equality.183 Currently, the enshrined model of 
relationship recognition is marriage, and, in some jurisdictions, 
“marriage-like” cohabiting heterosexual relationships. Since it is 
unlikely that different treatment of relationships that are not like 
marital relationships (such as non-sexual or non-cohabiting 
relationships) would be seen as a breach of equality guarantees, 
legislation that recognizes those relationships would not form part of 
any legislation that is enacted in response to constitutional 
litigation.184  
 
 182. For a persuasive discussion of the limits of the “sameness” and “difference” 
approaches to “equality” which require the choice of comparators, see CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32–45 (1987).  
 183. For some recent critiques of the Supreme Court of Canada’s equality jurisprudence, 
suggesting that despite the rhetoric of substantive equality, the court has not moved much 
beyond formal equality, see Hester Lessard, Mothers, Fathers, and Naming: Reflections on the 
Law Equality Framework and Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney-General), 16 CAN. J. 
WOMEN & L. 165 (2004); Diana Majury, The Charter, Equality Rights, and Women: 
Equivocation and Celebration, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 297 (2002); Margot Young, Blissed 
Out: Section 15 at Twenty, 33 SUP. CT. L. REV. 45 (2006); see also Boyd & Young, supra note 
35, at 767–70 (suggesting that formal equality discourses have dominated parliamentary 
discussions as well). For a more general discussion of some of the debates about “equality,” see 
Graycar & Morgan, supra note 174. 
 184. Though there is of course nothing to stop a legislature from adding such provisions to 
those required to be enacted.  
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Similarly, although equality litigation could lead to the extension 
of ascribed parental status to co-mothers in lesbian families formed 
through assisted reproductive means,185 it is highly unlikely that it 
could generate a more adaptive form of family recognition to 
accommodate the diverse needs of multi-parent families. On 
occasions when lesbian families have an involved biological father 
(often a gay man and possibly his partner as well), it may be the case 
that all adults intend to be equal parent-figures from the outset—a 
situation that really defies any heterosexual comparator.186 It is 
notable that both the Law Commission of New Zealand187 and the 
Victorian Law Reform Commission188 have recently proposed 
models that allow for more than two legal parents in lesbian and gay 
families (suggesting presumed status for the second female parent in 
lesbian families formed through assisted conception, with an 
additional form of opt-in status available for any male parent(s)).189  
 
 185. This has happened in South Africa. See J. v. Dir.-Gen., Dep’t of Home Affairs 2003 
(5) BCLR 463 (CC) (S. Afr.). More recently such litigation has also occurred in Canada. See 
M.D.R. v Ontario (Deputy Registrar General), [2006] O.J. No. 2268 (S.C.J.). 
 186. Although this is not the most common family form in gay and lesbian families, such 
multi-parent families do exist and have unmet legal needs. See Jenni Millbank, From Here to 
Maternity: A Review of the Research on Lesbian and Gay Families, 38 AUSTL. J. SOC. ISSUES 
541 (2003); JENNI MILLBANK, GAY & LESBIAN RIGHTS LOBBY, AND THEN . . . THE BRIDES 
CHANGED NAPPIES (2003), available at http://www.glrl.org.au/pdf/major_reports/Nappies 
April2003.pdf.  
 187. N.Z. LAW COMM’N, NEW ISSUES IN LEGAL PARENTHOOD 83–85 (2004) (particularly 
recommendations 10–12). 
 188. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES & 
ADOPTION, POSITION PAPER TWO (2005) suggested automatic parental status for both mothers 
and a method of multi-parent adoption with the consent of both mothers in the post-birth period. 
However, the latter aspect of the proposal was dropped in the final report on the basis that it 
was unwieldy and may not be actually needed by gay and lesbian families because of the 
generally non-residential role of biological fathers. See ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY & ADOPTION, FINAL REPORT 138–39 (2007).  
 189. Note that in the recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in A.A. v. B.B., [2007] Ont. 
C.A. 2, the court creatively used its parens patriae jurisdiction to accord parental status to the 
second mother in a lesbian family. The biological father already had legal status (it is unclear in 
the decision why this was the case). The mothers did not wish to sever the father’s legal status 
through a joint adoption order in their favor. In such a situation it is hard to see how an equality 
challenge could proceed due to the lack of any obvious comparator.  
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XIV. THE MARRIAGE BAN AND THE RESURRECTION OF MARRIAGE 
AS THE “GOLD STANDARD”190 
In 2004 the Australian federal government passed amendments to 
the Marriage Act of 1961 that were expressed as giving effect “to the 
Government’s commitment to protect the institution of marriage by 
ensuring that marriage means a union of a man and a woman and that 
same-sex relationships cannot be equated with marriage.”191 The 
amendments inserted a statutory definition of marriage as “the union 
of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily 
entered into for life”192 into the Act, which had not previously 
contained any such definition. The amendments also included a 
provision that prevents Australian courts from making a declaration 
of validity concerning a same-sex marriage contracted overseas.193 
Notably, no claim for a declaration had actually been heard by any 
court at the time of the amendments.  
Significantly, there was no need to protect against the “erosion”194 
of marriage in domestic law since courts universally had applied the 
common law definition of marriage which requires “one man and one 
woman.”195 There was no prospect of change to the common law 
definition, and no ability to bring a constitutional equality challenge 
to the Marriage Act itself. Apart from the foreign marriage provision, 
this amendment, then, was a purely rhetorical exercise, aimed at 
reaffirming the “special-ness” of marriage and singling out lesbians 
and gay men as objects of exclusion. Unsurprisingly, this maneuver 
 
 190. See Young & Boyd, supra note 39 (discussing civil unions in Canada and their role in 
configuring marriage as the “Gold Standard”); see also Seuffert, supra note 158, at 284–88, 
304. 
 191. Explanatory Memorandum, Marriage Amendment Bill, 2004 (Austl.); see also 
Australia, House of Representatives Hansard 24 June 2004, at 31,459 (Philip Ruddock).  
 192. Marriage Amendment Act, 2004, sched. 1 (Austl.). 
 193. Marriage Act, 1961, § 88EA (Austl.).  
 194. Australia, House of Representatives, supra note 191, at 31,459. 
 195. Drawn from Hyde v. Hyde, (1866) 1 L.R.P. & D. 130 (U.K.). Note particularly that in 
those jurisdictions that have introduced same-sex marriage through court-based challenges, not 
one has done so through the alteration of the common law meaning of marriage. Rather, courts 
have affirmed the common law meaning of marriage as exclusively heterosexual, but have held 
that this definition is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 
941, 969 (Mass. 2003); Halpern v. Canada (Attorney-General), [2003] 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529; 
Reference re Same Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.R. 698 (Can.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/7
p 121 Graycar Millbank book pages.doc  9/26/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters 161 
 
 
was made just prior to a federal election, as a timely “wedge issue.” 
Framing the issue as the “protection” of marriage was not a novel 
approach,196 but it effectively cornered the opposition, which had 
proposed comprehensive status as de facto couples for same-sex 
relationships in federal law and yet still supported the marriage ban. 
Another consequence of the Marriage Act was to capture 
discussion of the possibilities for relationship reform within very 
narrow parameters—marriage or marriage ban—and to render these 
synonymous with equality and inequality. In the months following 
the ban many described marriage as the only way of achieving “full,” 
“real,” or “legal” equality for lesbians and gay men, and marriage 
became the articulated goal of a number of Australian gay and 
lesbian rights groups for the first time.197 Somewhat ironically, given 
the vehemence of socialist feminist critiques of marriage in previous 
decades,198 marriage became the cause celebre of socialist199 and 
green groups.200 In essence, same-sex marriage became an instant 
equality goal because it had been expressly denied, rather than having 
actively been sought.201  
 
 196. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). For an up-
to-date list of the states that have adopted similar measures (“Baby Domas”), see The Marriage 
Map, http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/MarriageMap_06.pdf (last visited June 22, 2007). 
As of January 2007, more than half of the states had passed either a constitutional amendment 
or a statute banning marriage between same-sex partners. Only Massachusetts allows same-sex 
partners to marry, as a result of the decision in Goodridge. 
 197. See, for example, statements on the Australian Marriage Equality website, 
http://www.australianmarriageequality.com. This was also a feature of the New Zealand debates 
on civil unions. See Seuffert, supra note 158, at 285. 
 198. See, e.g., MICHELE BARRETT & MARY MCINTOSH, THE ANTI-SOCIAL FAMILY (2d ed. 
1991). 
 199. The socialist groups Socialist Alliance, Community Action Against Homophobia, and 
“Resistance” have all publicly called for same-sex marriage as their prime equality goal for 
lesbians and gay men, and have, for instance, recently linked homophobic violence to the denial 
of marriage. Rachel Evans & Farida Iqbal, Equal Love Rights Protests a Huge Success, GREEN 
LEFT WEEKLY (N.S.W., Austl.) Aug. 23, 2006, available at http://www.greenleft.org.au/2006 
/680/7839.  
 200. Interestingly, the Labor government’s introduction of civil unions in New Zealand led 
the New Zealand Greens to call for marriage. See Seuffert, supra note 158, at 285. The 
Tasmanian Greens went so far as to introduce a bill for same-sex marriage into Tasmanian 
Parliament, which would not have had the effect of marriage, being limited only to Tasmania. 
See Same Sex Marriage Bill, 2005 (Tas.), available at http://tas.greens.org.au/publications/ 
legislation/Same_Sex_Marriage_Bill_2005.pdf. 
 201. It is also possible that interest in marriage increased as a consequence of the wide 
implementation of presumptive forms of recognition, raising marriage as the “next” horizon. 
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Small scale surveys conducted by a gay and lesbian rights group 
in Victoria found that support for marriage doubled between 2001 
and 2005, which the authors attributed to “generational change in the 
value placed on the different forms of recognition.”202 However, it is 
notable that in the 2005 survey a significantly smaller proportion 
actually wanted marriage for their current relationship (45%) 
compared to those who wanted it to be “available” (80%).203 
Likewise, when a larger health survey in 2006 did not ask whether 
parties wanted marriage or civil unions as an abstract right, but 
whether they would formalize their current relationship through a 
state-sanctioned avenue if available, 52% of men and 39% of women 
indicated no intention or wish to formalize their current 
relationship.204 This suggests that a desire for marriage as a symbolic 
equality goal, and the desire actually to marry may not be just slightly 
but markedly different things.205 
CONCLUSION  
The path of relationship recognition law reform in Australia 
contrasts dramatically with legal developments and campaigns in the 
United States, primarily because of the centrality of marriage to the 
latter. In Australia marriage has had little significance for the legal 
rights of heterosexual couples for some time, and same-sex 
relationships have largely been legally assimilated within that 
framework of ascribing presumptive status to couples across most of 
Australia. The recent moves to developing forms of opt-in status are 
 
 202. RUTH MCNAIR & NIKOS THOMACOS, VICTORIAN GAY & LESBIAN RIGHTS LOBBY, 
NOT YET EQUAL: REPORT OF THE VGLRL SAME SEX RELATIONSHIPS SURVEY 2005, at 38 
(2005), available at http://www.vglrl.org.au/files/VGLRL%202005%20-%20SSRS%20Report. 
pdf. 
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Id. at 39–40. A much higher proportion of respondents, 79.8%, wanted marriage to be available. 
Id. at 38. 
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 205. For a fascinating exploration of attitudes to relationship rights among lesbians and gay 
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interesting because they come in addition to, not instead of, ascriptive 
status. This clearly separates the issues of legal rights on the one hand 
and of symbolic status on the other.  
The piecemeal and legislative nature of reforms necessitated by 
Australia’s federal system, and the absence of a Bill of Rights may be 
viewed as both beneficial and problematic. So, for example, while 
New South Wales became the first state to recognize same-sex 
relationships (as it was the first to legislate for extensive recognition 
of heterosexual non-marital relationships), it is clear that the reforms 
that followed in the other states and territories were broader in their 
impact. Specifically, later reforming states were more likely to amend 
a wider range of laws to accord parity to heterosexual and same-sex 
couples and to include parenting rights in the reform package. It is 
fair to infer that jurisdictions have taken courage from each others’ 
reforms.  
Problematically, there are now widespread rights for same-sex 
couples at the state and territory level, while at the federal level the 
picture remains one of widespread exclusion with little prospect of de 
facto rights under a hostile federal government.206 This is likely to 
cause particular difficulty in the area of parenting rights, where 
federal and state law both govern parental status and a schism has 
been generated between the new presumptive parental status granted 
to co-mothers by some state and territory laws, and federal law which 
does not recognize this status.207  
The legislative origins of reform also permit reform models that 
are not strictly comparative, as have been those that resulted from 
equality litigation. Rather, some of the Australian reforms have been 
sui generis, such as those covering non-couples and also those 
proposed for multi-parent lesbian and gay families.  
Yet, relationship rights for non-couples, at first proposed as a 
radical, even subversive, move away from couple recognition toward 
legal acknowledgment of interdependency, have recently been co-
 
 206. And no prospect of marriage given that both government and opposition supported the 
Marriage Amendments in 2004. However, see the proposals in HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, SAME-SEX: SAME ENTITLEMENTS (2007), available at 
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/human_rights/samesex/report/pdf/SSSE_Report.pdf. 
 207. See Millbank, supra note 10; H & J (2006) F.M.C.A. Fam. 514 (Austl.). 
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opted by anti-equality activists who have sought to take the “sex” out 
of relationship law reform. An additional irony is that while marriage 
was rarely on the table in Australia during a period of intense legal 
change, the introduction of a marriage ban in 2004 seems to have 
generated a groundswell of support among lesbian and gay 
communities for marriage. These developments suggest that, in all 
reform movements, comparators are never far away and that 
standards are not universal, but rather form shifting sands in the 
context of ongoing debate.  
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